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Migration, Remittances and Social and Spatial Organisation of Rural Households in China

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Just 40 years ago, China's urbanisation was only 20 per cent. Today it has surpassed the 50 per cent mark. Such rapid urbanisation is a result of not only skyrocketing economic growth but also massive rural–urban migration. The remittances that migrants sent home have for the past 30 years been crucial for the livelihood of the rural Chinese. "Going out" or *dagong*, meaning leaving home to work somewhere else, is widely considered to be the only means for rural households to overcome poverty and improve their standard of living. In the Chinese countryside, arable land is extremely limited. Massive poverty and starvation are still fresh in the memory of the rural Chinese – 30 million people died in a famine just half a century ago. It is therefore not surprising that millions have left farms to look for urban work since the economic reforms that began in the late 1970s have made such mobility possible.

Rural–urban labour migrants represent the bulk of the "floating population", or persons not living in their place of household registration (*hukou*), who amounted to 230 million in 2012 or 17 per cent of the population, and they are projected to increase to 350 million by 2050 (*People's Daily*, 2010; National Population and Family Planning Commission, 2012). There is a large body of research on the household registration or *hukou* system (e.g., Goodkind and West, 2002; Mallee, 2003; Wu and Treiman, 2004; Wang, 2005; Chan, 2009). The institutional, economic and social barriers between the urban and rural Chinese, due in part to the *hukou* system, are quite similar to those facing transnational labour migrants, especially those at the lower end of the economic spectrum. For example, the rural Chinese do not enjoy the urban benefits that holders of urban *hukou* do, such as access to

subsidised housing, education, healthcare and desired segments of the labour market. Jobs that are available to rural migrants are usually on the bottom rungs, with low pay, poor working conditions and no career prospects. In addition, much like transnational migrants, Chinese rural migrants are physically separate from the rest of the family for extended periods of time, resulting in split households that are stretched across long distances. Also similar to transnational migrants, rural migrants in China seek to maintain the family as an intact social unit despite their physical separation.

This chapter focuses on the rural family, the site where decisions about migrant work are made and where the impacts of migration and remittances are felt directly. In particular, I aim to show how migrant work and remittances, interacting with social norms, have transformed the production and spatial organisation of rural households. Drawing from interviews with 26 households conducted at multiple times between 1995 and 2012, as part of a project that includes 300 households in Anhui and Sichuan provinces, I identify a nascent lifecycle of migrant households that spans two, in some cases three, generations. Using household biographies and narratives, I highlight the importance of remittances, how their use has changed over time, and how in the process of pursuing migrant work and remittances rural households have reorganised themselves socially and spatially.

Remittances and household organisation

Remittances are at the core of explanations for labour migration. The literature on international migration and internal migration highlight the role of remittances in reducing poverty and raising standards of living, diversifying risk, and improving investment in human and physical capital (e.g., Russell, 1986; Hadi, 1999; Taylor, 1999; Hoang and Yeoh, Chapter 11, in this volume; Sana and Massey, 2005; Yang, 2006; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010). At the same time, scholars have pointed out that remittances may make the left-behind more dependent and vulnerable, and that not all migrations are successful (Hoang and Yeoh, Chapter 11, in this volume; Kothari, 2002; Skeldon, 2004; Azama and Gubertb, 2006).

While most studies that address remittances focus on the economic rationale and impacts, less attention has been paid to the social dimension of labour migration. But migration and remittances are part of the social processes that shape the meanings of the home and household. For example, to the migrants, "home" takes on new meanings

as a physical site that offers security but is distanced from daily life (Fan and Wang, 2008; Fan, 2009; Graham et al., 2012). "Being family" also takes on new meanings in the face of geographic separation and reconfiguration that impact intimate relationships (Yeoh, 2009; Bustamante and Aleman, 2007). The productive and reproductive relations between migrants and the left-behind are constantly reworked, negotiated and renegotiated, constrained by and challenging traditional gender and generational roles and norms (Hugo, 2002; Asis et al., 2004; Xiang, 2007). In the vein of the new economics of migration theory, Stark and his associates advanced the notion that remittances are part of an implicit agreement between the migrant and the left-behind under the assumption that the migrant will eventually return (e.g., Stark and Lucas, 1988). Transnational migrants who move frequently across borders may be maintaining "flexible families" with the left-behind spouse and children on home or foreign soil (Skeldon, 1997; Waters, 2002; Willis et al., 2004; Hugo, 2006). Who is the migrant and who is/are left behind is not only an economic question but fundamentally a social question. To the extent that households are the site where migration decisions are made and where remittances make direct impacts, a social dimension to considering remittances is necessary, involving questions such as how remittances shape family structure and household organisation, including gender roles and intergenerational relations and the spatial configuration of the family across or within national borders.

Investigation of the social dimension of remittances demands one or more of the following strategies. First, social structure and relations are complex and difficult to measure, requiring analytical approaches beyond macrolevel aggregation, such as mixed methods, qualitative inquiry and/or field observations. The voice of the migrant and their family is an effective tool to capture the nuanced processes of collaboration and conflict in the household (Rigg and Salamanca, 2011). Second, both the migrant and the left-behind constitute the family structure that frames the pursuit and use of remittances. Therefore a "migrant–left-behind nexus" approach (Toyota et al., 2007) which informs understanding of the family as a site of negotiation, strategising and agency is superior to one that considers migrants and the left-behind in isolation or sees the left-behind in a passive light. In the same vein, it is useful to conceptualise the family and extended family support as not necessarily in situ but possibly spatially dispersed. For example, studies of the "transnational family" (Hochschild, 2000; Yeoh et al., 2002, 2005) and "global householding" (Douglass, 2006) which focus on international migration consider family relations that are stretched across

nations. As mentioned earlier, internal migrants who are physically separate from their family members for extended periods of time – such as rural–urban migrants in China – share similar householding experiences with transnational migrants. Finally, the analysis of generational changes requires a longitudinal perspective to observe how a household's lifecycle unfolds, a task that demands sustained engagement, including multiple visits rather than a one-off survey (Kusakabe and Pearson, Chapter 3; Rigg and Salamanca, 2011; Rao, Chapter 2, in this volume). The empirical study on which this chapter is based was designed to include all of the above three strategies: a qualitative bottom-up approach; consideration of migrants and the left-behind as part of the nexus rather than dichotomously; and a longitudinal view of the family's lifecycle spanning up to 30 years or more.

While migration in China is the subject of a large body of research, this study is particularly informed by research that focuses on the household and on different generations of migrants. To pioneer migrants, predominately male, who began *dagong* in the 1980s, remittances helped them to overcome poverty and made their subsistence possible (Quanguo zonggonghui, 2010; Yue et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). Back then, migrant work was considered to be a short-term rather than long-term solution. But that proved to be a short-lived assumption as migrants continued *dagong* year after year, despite its requiring the household to be split between the village and the location of migrant work. Clearly, the lack of economic opportunities in the countryside compelled migrants to rely on *dagong* for earnings for as long as they could. Many have become "career" migrants, leaving their wife and children behind (Yue et al., 2010; Zhu and Chen, 2010). Over time, migrants who had achieved subsistence would use remittances to finance household expenditures, including house construction or renovation – guided by and reinforcing a deep-rooted tradition that a new or expanded house is necessary for a son to get married (see below) – weddings, children's education, and agricultural and entrepreneurial activities. It appears that *dagong* as a way of life is being passed from one generation to the next (Liang, 2011). For the younger generation who grew up witnessing pioneer migrants bring back remittances that were converted into a new house, a television set or a washing machine, it is only logical that they should take up migrant work as soon as they finish school (Wang, 2001; Liu and Cheng, 2008; National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). The reliance on remittances also explains why the younger generation is increasingly receptive to both spouses doing migrant work, leaving the children behind to be raised by their grandparents, and sending back remittances

that support care-giving and other rural activities (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010; Fan et al., 2011).

Despite the increasingly broad participation in migrant work – especially spouses and the second generation – there is little evidence that migrants want to leave the countryside for good (Zhu, 2007; Cai and Wang, 2008; Fan, 2008: 166; Cai and Xu, 2009; Zhu and Chen, 2010; Fan, 2011). Barriers to permanent settlement in cities include not only *hukou*-related constraints but also the absence of a sustained economic future and a sense of social belonging. Migrant work is not stable, does not offer career mobility and cannot support the urban cost of living. Moreover, migrants are seen as outsiders and inferior to urbanites, and they are not integrated into urban society. Therefore, to migrant workers, the city is considered to be a place to earn wages and augment household income rather than a place to take root. As a result, circular migration and split households persist, for the purpose of protecting and building the social and economic bases for migrants' eventual return to the countryside (Fan and Wang, 2008). This in part explains migrants' building new houses and expanding existing houses in the village despite their constant absence. Some have decided to purchase a house or apartment in nearby towns in order to engage in non-farmwork upon their return (Duan and Ma, 2011). Along the same vein, migrants leave behind family members to farm or lease out farmland to others – usually without collecting rent – not because of economic gain from agriculture but in order to safeguard and maintain their farmland, again for anticipated return in the future.

Gender roles and intergenerational relations are crucial to understanding the lifecycle of a migrant household, whose social and spatial organisation is continuously being reshaped and renegotiated (Gamburd, Chapter 6; Kreager and Schröder-Butterfill, Chapter 7, in this volume). Thus it is useful here to review briefly the cultural and social bases of gender and kinship norms in rural China that are especially relevant to this research. Patriarchal ideology underlies three household traditions: the inside–outside dichotomy, patrilocal exogamy and household division or *fenjia*, all reflected by son preference and reinforcing gender inequality. The inside–outside dichotomy defines the woman's place to be inside the home and the man's responsibility to be outside (*nan zhu wai nu zhu nei*) (Entwisle and Henderson, 2000: 298; Hershatter, 2000; Mann, 2000).[1] This spatial division of labour prescribes women's productive role to be in the domestic sphere, including care-giving, and men's role to include earning wages. Therefore, when a migrant work opportunity is available, it is expected that the husband will take it while the wife stays behind (Stockman, 1994). However, the availability of migrant work since the 1980s has shifted the inside–outside boundaries – the departure of the husband leaves all farming work to the wife, whose "inside" sphere then increasingly encompasses not only domestic work but also farmwork (Jacka, 2006).

Second, with patrilocal exogamy, the wife moves out from the natal family to join the husband's family. This practice is historically central to household formation in rural China. The tradition underlies women's low status because the eventual loss of daughters (and their labour) to the husband's family discourages the natal family to invest in girls' education relative to their male siblings (Li, 1994; Lu, 1997). Patrilocal exogamy also explains early marriage, because the husband's family is eager to recruit the daughter-in-law for her labour and reproduction, whereas the natal family is interested in shifting her living expenses to the husband's family. Marriage as an institution is therefore practised as a contract negotiated between two families involving the transfer of rights over women and their production and reproduction. In this connection, the prospective husband's economic capacity becomes important. Monetary compensation to the natal family for raising the daughter takes place in the form of the brideprice. In addition, a new house or an expanded house – often judged in terms of size – is one of the determining factors of men's competitiveness in the marriage market, especially in light of the grossly imbalanced sex ratio at birth due to draconian birth-control policy (e.g., Cai and Lavely, 2003). It is logical, therefore, for rural households to use remittances to fund house-building projects.

Finally, *fenjia*, or household division, refers to a traditional practice especially in rural Chinese households where the father at an advanced age would divide his property among his adult sons. *Fenjia* is gendered because traditionally sons but not daughters have the privilege of inheriting household property. It is a process of transmission of economic control from one generation to the next and of adult sons to establish their own households (Wakefield, 1998). However, the prevalence of migrant work among rural households reinforces the value and practicality of an extended family living under one roof, so that non-migrant members, especially parents, can help to care for the left-behind farmland and children. Recent research has shown that the amount of remittances that migrants send back is a function of the amount of care-giving provided by the non-migrants (Fan and Wang, 2008; Fan et al., 2011). In short, intergenerational collaboration among the extended family facilitates migrant work, and as a result migrant households

may favour skipping or postponing the traditional kinship process of household division and opt for tightening the extended family ties instead.

Village G

As part of a joint project with the Renmin University of China, we conducted in-depth interviews with 300 households in 12 villages – three villages each from two counties in Sichuan and another two counties in Anhui – during the Spring Festival of 1995, 2005 and 2009, with supplementary visits up to January 2012. We selected Sichuan and Anhui because they are major sources of rural–urban migrants. Within the provinces, we selected the counties and villages based on the following criteria in 1995: in terms of economic development they were representative of the respective provinces; they had been sending out migrant workers for quite some time; and migrant workers accounted for at least, respectively, 20 per cent of the county's labour force and 30 per cent of the village's labour force (Du and Bai, 1997: 5; Du, 2000). In each village we randomly selected 15 migrant households (where one or more members had had migrant work experience) and 10 non-migrant households to be part of the sample. Over time, as expected, almost all non-migrant households have become migrant households.

In this chapter, I focus on one of the 12 sampled villages. For the sake of confidentiality, I shall not disclose Village G's location other than by saying that it is in the northern part of Anhui, six hours of ground transportation from the nearest major airport and quite remote from urban life. Also, I refer to villagers only by their pseudonyms (see Table 8.1).

There are about 1,600 households in Village G with a total population close to 6,000. Practically every household has sent one or more members to engage in migrant work. At present, approximately two-thirds of the population are migrant workers. Despite the prevalence of migrant work, very few households have moved out of the village for good. Since 2005, only five households have decided and managed to move their *hukou* registration elsewhere. Fewer than 20 households are completely physically absent from the village, leaving no members behind while still keeping their *hukou* registration there. This is not dissimilar to rural areas elsewhere in China – despite many years of migrant work, the rural Chinese are not planning to move to cities on a permanent basis. As discussed earlier, research has shown that economic, social and institutional barriers have all contributed to migrants' intention to eventually return to the countryside (see also "Household biographies" below).

Village G shares other features with villages that send out migrant workers. First, the village is poor. Not until the early 2000s was electricity available for every household in the village. Second, the labour surplus is persistently large because arable land is in short supply. The average amount of farmland allocated per household is only 0.8 mu (approximately 0.13 acres or 0.05 hectares). As such, agriculture is simply not enough to make ends meet and has lost its subsistence function. Increasingly, the cash economy has replaced the subsistence economy – villagers sell crops and buy foods and consumer goods from the township market and have virtually given up animal husbandry. Therefore almost all pigsties are now left empty. Third, non-agricultural economic activities in or near the village are limited. To earn non-farm wages, villagers must leave home to work in the towns and cities. Fourth, over time the number and range of labour migrants have increased. During the 1980s and 1990s, considerably more men than women engaged in migrant work. At present, participation in migrant work is much more extensive, involving men, women and their children, as well as the second-generation migrants who have been born since the 1980s.

With two-thirds of the population, primarily of working age, living elsewhere most of the year, children and the elderly constitute the de facto population of the village. Not surprisingly, the absence of parents has had negative impacts on children's education. Most children of the village quit school at junior high. Every year, fewer than ten children continue to senior high.

Table 8.1 is an inventory of the 26 households that constitute our sample. It is organised based on information in 2009, assuming that a husband–wife pair constitutes the core of a household, and sorted by the age of the oldest child (see on next page). "Interviewees" are marked by a single asterisk, referring to (a) the oldest migrant in a migrant household during the 1995 interview or (b) the household head in a non-migrant household during the 1995 interview. In addition, the first person(s) in the household to do migrant work are referred to as "first migrants" and are marked by double asterisks. The vast majority of individuals with one or two asterisks are men, reflecting the traditional gender norms in rural China where men are the designated household heads and wage earners.

I created pseudonames for husbands and wives to correspond with their respective real family surnames. For example, all of the Zhous correspond with the same real family name. Family names in Village G reveal strong lineage, as is the case in many Chinese villages. Nine of the husbands and two of the wives are Zhus. Other common family names are Zhang, Zhou and Ding.

Table 8.1 Sampled households in Village G

Household	Husband	Wife	Age (2009)								Migration type***		
			Husband	Wife	Oldest child	Youngest child	Parent #1	Parent #2	Oldest grandchild	Youngest grandchild	1995	2005	2009
#1	Zhang Da*	Zhu Yifang	36**	35	11	6	67	63			1	1	1
#2	Zhang Daiyang	Jiang Fuming*	38	39**	12	1					1	N	N
#3	Li Housheng	Zhu Yijie*	40	37**	13	9	65				1	N	1
#4	Yu Zhushan	Zhang Fengying*	39	35**	14						1	O	O
#5	Zhu Anhua*	Deng Wenying	44**	43	17	9					1	1	1
#6	Zhang Jian*	Gao Yongqiao	35**	34**	17	15	65				N	1	1
#7	Lu Zhushi*	Jiang Lan	37**	35	18	14	80				1	N	N
#8	Zhu Ansheng*	Jiang Zaimei	42**	41	19	15	75	75			1	1	2
#9	Zhou Weijin*	Deng Huangsheng	43**	45	19	17	72				1	1	1
#10	Zhou Zhenxia*	Ding Shilan	41**	41	19	17					1	1	2
#11	Ding Nianbao*	Li Jizhu	44	44	21	20			8	2	N	N	N
#12	Ding Baopeng*	Yin Yurong& 47**	46	22	20					1	2	2	
#13	Zhu Anfa*	Li Xujie	48**	47	23	22					1	1	2
#14	Zhu Anmao*	Zhang Jinfang	49	47**	23	21					N	N	1
#15	Deng Wenzhong*	Yang Chiping	46**	44**	23	20					N	O	2
#16	Zhu Yiping*	Jiang Yongmei	46**	43	25	18					1	2	R
#17	Zhu Wenkuo*	Zhang Wenqing	47**	45	25	19	65	65			1	2	1
#18	Zhu Shitai*	Yang Shanlan	50**	50	26	24			5	1	1	2	R
#19	Jiang Fujie*	Li Dongmei	49	48	26	18**					N	N	1
#20	Zhu Anshu*	Yin Fuping	70**	65	29	23					1	2	2
#21	Chen Wenping*	Qian Pufang	57	55	29	27					N	N	N
#22	Zhu Shixi*	Jiang Zhongrong	56**	48	30	24			7	4	2	R	R
#23	Zhou Yuyang*	Deng Hou'en	61	60	35	29**			8	4	N	1	N
#24	Jiang Binyi*	Deng Baozhu	62**	60	37**	33**			17	9	2	2	R/2
#25	Deng Jianjia*	Shi Shaoying	59**	58	40**	24			15	5	2	R	R
#26	Jiang Zhongfeng*	Luo Jinying	64**	65	41**				20	16	2	2	R/2

* Interviewee.
** First migrant(s).
*** N, 1, 2, R, R/2; see definitions in Table 8.2.

The inventory also includes the oldest and youngest children, the oldest and youngest grandchildren, and the husband's parents. Some of these family members may not be living under the same roof as the interviewee but, since intergenerational assistance is common, I included in the inventory the interviewee's children and grandchildren, and the husband's parents whose permanent home is in the same village. Because of the patrilocal tradition, the inventory includes the husband's parents – who, if available and able, are expected to help with farming and the left-behind children – but not the wife's parents. However, in general, interviewees gave only scant information, if any, about their parents. As for interviewees' children, although some are grown and have established their own separate households, they are included in the table because they may be relying on the interviewee and spouse to help to take care of left-behind grandchildren and/or farmland. For the sake of simplicity, Table 8.1 excludes the wife's parents; family members who died before 2009; daughters- and sons-in-law; married daughters and married granddaughters (who are seen as members of another household); and the interviewee's siblings.

There is clearly a correlation between the interviewee's age and the family's lifecycle. Interviewees in their 30s and 40s mostly have children who are teenagers or younger. Interviewees in their 50s and 60s have older children and may already have grandchildren. By sorting the households according to the age of the interviewee's oldest child, Table 8.1 resembles a progression from "young households" to "old households." In general, young households more frequently report the presence of parents, probably because those parents are also younger and are healthy enough to be involved. Conversely, older households are more likely than younger households to report grandchildren. An exception is household #11, where the couple, both 44 years of age in 2009, already has two grandchildren.[2] The last three columns of Table 8.1 describe the migration types, the definitions of which are given in Table 8.2. Although three points in time (1995, 2005 and 2009) do not encompass all the household changes that have taken place, the two tables together point to two significant trends which I shall elaborate on below: migrant work is increasingly prevalent; and the number of two-generation and/or replacement households has increased.

Migrant work is increasingly prevalent

By design, 7 of the 26 households interviewed in 1995 were "non-migrant" households (#6, #11, #14, #15, #19, #21 and #23). By 2009 the number of non-migrant households had declined to five (#2, #7,

Table 8.2 Migration types of sampled households

Migration type			1995	2005	2009
Non-migrant	N	No household members doing migrant work.	7	7	5
One-generation	1	All migrant workers are from one generation.	15	8	8
Two-generation	2	Migrant workers are from two generations.	4	7	6
Replacement	R	Return of first-generation migrants. All migrant workers are from the second generation.	0	2	4
Replacement/ two-generation	R/2	Return of first-generation migrants. All migrant workers are from the second and third generations.	0	0	2
Other	O	Attaining city *hukou*; or missing.	0	2	1
Sum			26	26	26

#11, #21 and #23). Those five households shared an important feature – all had engaged in local entrepreneurial and/or government work. And the interview narratives show that four of the five households had been involved in migrant work activities at some point between 1995 and 2009. Only household #21 reported no migrant work activities at all throughout the period. These results underscore the notion that migrant work is increasingly common and is very much the norm among rural households.

It seems that the only households that had not participated in migrant work at all were those engaged in profitable and/or stable non-agricultural activities locally. Chen Wenping of household #21, for example, was an entrepreneur who in the early 1990s started an industrial enterprise in a nearby town. Since 2001 he had been employed as a teacher at a local elementary school. Absent such activities, agriculture alone was a grossly inadequate source of livelihood, leaving villagers with few options other than migrant work in order to make ends meet.

Two-generation and replacement households

I have categorised migrant households into "one-generation", "two-generation", "replacement" and "replacement/two-generation" households. For the sake of simplicity, hereafter I shall omit the

"migrant" description of those households (e.g., two-generation migrant households will be referred to simply as two-generation households). Over time, the number of "one-generation" households had declined while the numbers of "two-generation", "replacement" and "replacement/two-generation" households had increased. These changes reflect three processes. First, as households age and as children become adults, more households will become "two-generation", "replacement" and "replacement/two-generation" households. The inventory in Table 8.1 shows that none of the oldest children in "two-generation" households were under 19; and none of the oldest children in "replacement" households were under 25.

Second, migrant work as a way of life is being passed from one generation to the next. Not only are two-generation households increasing in number but third-generation migrants – whose parents and grandparents are, or have been, migrant workers – have also come into being (#24 and #26). In both households #24 and #26, by 2009 the interviewees were in their 60s and had returned from migration, being replaced by their children and grandchildren as second- and third-generation migrants. These younger migrants, who grew up in the 1980s and 1990s, witnessed how their parents and other villagers brought back remittances that benefited their own families. Such observations might have motivated them to start migrant work as soon as they finished school or reached working age, and to consider migrant work a "career path" rather than a short-term solution. As a result, the younger generations were increasingly detached from farming, while multiple generations of villagers found themselves heavily dependent on remittances.

Third, two-generation and replacement households revealed specific decisions made by first-generation migrants. Two-generation households may be a result of first-generation migrants continuing migrant work well past the peak ages for the migrant labour market (e.g., construction and factory assembly lines) and even after their children have already begun migrant work themselves. An extreme case is the 70-year-old in household #20, who despite his advanced age continued to work as a janitor in Jiangsu. These veteran migrants want to earn urban wages as much as they can and as long as there is work. In that light, the second-generation's joining migrant work does not necessarily replace first-generation migrants. Another decision of first-generation migrants is to return in order to facilitate their children's migrant work – by taking care of farmland and grandchildren. Among the six "replacement" and "replacement/two generation" households,

four had grandchildren under the age of ten (#18, #22, #24 and #25). Replacement makes it possible for the second generation to pursue migrant work but does not necessarily mean that returnees are giving up non-farmwork altogether. For example, Zhu Yiping of household #16 continued to do non-farmwork near his village. Zhu Shitai of household #18 still planned to do migrant work in the future. The above underscores the fact that agricultural work is an inferior source of livelihood and that migrant work is instead the priority for both older and younger generations.

Clearly, remittances were an important source of income for Village G. Over time, the use of remittances had changed, and reliance on remittances had transformed the social and spatial organisation of households. The household biographies below aim to showcase those changes as well as the underlying social processes.

Household biographies

In the following I use two households' biographies and narratives to illustrate the importance of remittances, how the use of remittances has changed over time, and how migrant work has transformed households' social and spatial organisation and given rise to tensions and conflicts as well as new opportunities for collaboration in the household. Personal stories and narratives are powerful means by which to identify migrants' agency, and they enable a bottom-up research approach that foregrounds the voices and experiences of marginalised individuals in society (Nagar et al., 2002; Jacka, 2006: 10; Rigg and Salamanca, 2011). Qualitative materials based on household biographies and narratives are especially useful in revealing complexity, details and subtle processes, such as negotiation and practices that are "taken-for-granted, ruled out, or modified in the process of blending individual narratives within household narratives" (Jarvis, 1999). Jarvis' comment about households' qualitative life history succinctly summarises its multilayered advantages: "a biographical representation of household behaviour comprises not only the interweaving of parallel histories (work histories, family milestone events, personal relationship histories) but also the negotiation of the interlinkage and temporal ordering of such events ... ". In a similar vein, and arguing that migration is a much more complex concept than a journey from one place to another, McHugh (2000) calls attention to research approaches that represent "migrations as cultural events rich in meaning for individuals, families, social groups, communities and nations".

The terms "family" and "household" are often used interchangeably. "Family" is usually thought of as comprising individuals related by blood or marriage, and "household" as comprising individuals who live in the same residence. Households may comprise the nuclear family – spouses and their children – and their relatives and other individuals. Across cultures, it is expected that members of the nuclear family live under the same roof. In that light, in this research I focus on the spatial organisation of the nuclear family, with attention also being paid to other close relatives. In particular, I examine the split-household family, referring to a family whose members who under normal circumstances would live in the same place are in reality living in different places. With regard to the nuclear family, a split household refers to the split between spouses, and between them and their children.

Over the past two to three decades, rural migrants in China have engaged in different forms of household arrangement and split households. During the 1980s and 1990s, "single migrants" (unmarried adults) and "sole migrants" (one of the spouses) were the most prevalent. Men constituted the vast majority of sole migrants, who pursued migrant work while leaving behind the wife and children. As mentioned earlier, this is an extended form of the traditional inside–outside division of labour. Upon marriage and the husband's pursuit of migrant work – the outside – the wife then shoulders the responsibility for not only the physical home but also other village activities, including agriculture, all forming part of the woman's inside sphere (Jacka, 2006). Since the 2000s, "couple migrants" – both spouses pursuing migrant work and leaving their children behind – have become increasingly common. Unlike the sole migrant model where one of the parents stays behind to take care of the children, couple migrants leave their children behind to be raised typically by grandparents or other relatives. Other forms of household arrangement include the spouses bringing some of their children ("partial family migrants") or all of their children ("family migrants") to the location of the migrant work. All in all, the proliferation of split households has resulted in a large number of children and elderly being left behind (Zhou, 2004; Xiang, 2007). Table 8.3 provides brief definitions of the different forms of spatial organisation of migrant households (see also Fan et al., 2011).

I have selected to highlight households #26 and #12 because they are of different generations. By 2009, household #26 had had three generations of migrant workers; household #12 had had two. Appendices A and B show for selected years the respective age and location of the husband, wife, sons, unmarried daughters, grandsons, unmarried

Table 8.3 Migrant households' spatial organisation

Type	Description
Single	Single.
Sole	Married, spouse and all children in village.
Couple	Married, spouse also migrant, all children in village.
Partial family	Married, spouse also migrant, brought along some children (not working) and left other children behind in village.
Family	Married, spouse also migrant, brought along all children (not working).

granddaughters, daughters-in-law and granddaughters-in-law. They also summarise the use of remittances, household events such as house-building and children getting married, and the household's spatial arrangement according to Table 8.3.

Household #26

Jiang Zhongfeng started migrant work in 1983 when he was 38 years old. Poverty compelled him to take up coalmine work in Shaanxi, leaving his wife, a son and a daughter behind, and starting a sole-migration arrangement:

> In 1983, my son was going to get married. We were poor and our house that was made of mud and straw was small with only two rooms. [To bring in a daughter-in-law] we had to expand the house and took out a loan. Also, adding one person increased the demand on food. Our 5.1 mu (0.85 acre) of land was not enough even for subsistence. We needed cash to pay off our debt and buy food. There was no other way out except *dagong*.

The above quote exemplifies the poverty that many rural Chinese have faced, as well as the social norms that motivated and pressured them to build new houses or expand existing houses. The patriarchal ideology which centres on sons, combined with the patrilocal tradition, demands that parents create space for sons when they get married. Not only was Jiang Zhongfeng under the pressure to enlarge the house but also he took out a loan of CNY 4,000 (yuan) in order to fund the brideprice.

The remittances that Jiang Zhongfeng sent during ten years of coalmine work "lifted the family out of poverty". Not only did he pay off the debt but he added five brick rooms to the house, thus allowing

his married son, daughter-in-law and grandchildren to live under the same roof. However, the extended-family practice is gender specific. The son remains a member of the household even after he is married and has children. The daughter, however, left the household upon getting married in 1993 and from that point on virtually disappeared from the narrative.

Patriarchal ideology is further illustrated through Jiang Zhongfeng's commitment to find work for his son, whereas he made no mention of his daughter's work. In 1993, Jiang Zhongfeng arranged for his son, about 25 years old then, to join him in Shaanxi in construction work, but his son could not tolerate the work and returned home shortly afterwards. Jiang's assistance did not stop there:

> I decided to use my savings and took out a loan to buy my son a truck, so that he could do transportation work [at home].

Therefore, despite the son's coming of age, Jiang's sole-migrant arrangement prevailed. Over the years, his remittances improved the family's wellbeing, as summarised by his wife, Luo Jinying:

> In the past, we were poor and always hungry. Now, because of *dagong*, we can make fried snacks for the Spring Festival. And we can buy fertilizer . . . We have cash to rent machines to plow, sow seeds, and harvest. We are eating better and we have more dishes at meals. My son can afford to smoke. We now drink tea instead of just water.

Remittances support not only subsistence but also investment in agriculture, as well as consumption – such as cigarettes and tea. In 1995 the family installed a telephone. Miscellaneous other expenditure, including social expenses, were also made possible by remittances:

> In the village, there are lots of expenses. We need cash for wedding and other kinds of gifts, medical expenses, etc. Therefore, *dagong* is a must.

In short, while migrant work was seen in the 1980s as a means to provide subsistence and a short-term solution to poverty, by the 1990s it was considered to be a necessary step towards building the family's future, including household formation:

> Without *dagong*, you have no future. You will have to borrow money for food. People who stay behind cannot even get a loan, let alone find a wife.

The above comment underscores a widely held notion that remittances are key to rural households' economic and social sustainability, whereas the future of non-migrant households is bleak.

In 1995 and 1996, Jiang changed jobs from coalmines to construction and moved to work first in Shanghai and then in Ningbo. About four years later, in 2000, Jiang's son decided to sell the truck and together with his wife joined Jiang to work in Ningbo. Jiang's son worked in transportation, having benefited from his transportation work at home, and his daughter-in-law worked in a factory, leaving behind three children aged 11, 9 and 7 to be raised by grandmother Luo.

The decision of Jiang's son and daughter-in-law to work in Ningbo was a significant step in the household's lifecycle. First, this was the beginning of second-generation migration and couple migration, both facilitated by the parents, Jiang and Luo, and by changing gender and generational roles and changing productive and social relations between the migrants and the left-behind. Much like how he had helped the son buy a truck, Jiang's experience in and familiarity with Ningbo was a catalyst for his son and daughter-in-law to find work there. In addition, the availability of Luo to take care of the three grandchildren was a critical factor in making couple migration possible. While the wife's joining migrant work was uncommon among Jiang and Luo's own generation, due to persistent gender norms and perhaps the absence of help to raise children, the second generation who benefit from intergenerational division of labour can more freely pursue couple migration. But this also means that a grandmother like Luo would be performing care-giving for two generations of children – first to her own children and now to her grandchildren. Although the daughter-in-law called home every two or three days, Lou was the de facto parent for all three young children. As mentioned earlier, intergenerational division of labour was also the reason why *fenjia* or household division was postponed.

Second, couple migration has changed how remittances are used. Jiang's remittances in earlier years were used for housing, wedding and agriculture, and over the years had boosted the household's standard of living, permitting, for example, the purchase of a washing machine, a refrigerator and a colour television. The bulk of what Jiang's son and daughter-in-law sent back, however, was used on the left-behind children's education.

Third, the second generation's pursuit of migrant work might motivate the beginning of a replacement process, leading to older migrants' return to the countryside. Beginning in 2005, Jiang gradually reduced the time that he engaged in migrant work, first to six months a year and by 2008 to two months a year.

Finally, by inheriting migrant work as a source of livelihood, the second generation is not only practising "migrant work as a way of life" but is a conduit passing it down to the third generation and beyond. By 2005, Jiang's oldest grandson, aged 16, had finished junior high and decided to go to Ningbo to work. In other words, three generations of migrants from the same family were working in the same city. The other two grandchildren, aged 14 and 12, stayed in the village to attend junior high and primary school, respectively, and were taken care of by Luo. From Jiang to his son to his grandson, the age of first migrant work decreased from 38 to 32 to 16. Also reduced was the children and grandchildren's extent of experience with farming and local economic activities. Jiang's main livelihood was farming prior to his starting migrant work in 1983. His son, though not actively involved in farming, did transportation work in and around the village prior to migrant work. The grandson, however, started migrant work immediately after finishing high school. All of the above suggest that from one generation to the next, migrant work is increasingly accepted as a logical step in one's work life, and remittances have become a normal and necessary means of livelihood.

In 2007, Jiang's second grandchild finished junior high and started to work in a factory in Ningbo. Jiang, then 62, had begun to plan his return to the village to start a tricycle business. Tricycles that load passengers and goods are commonly seen in and around the village and are a popular means for the elderly to earn cash.

By 2009, all three grandchildren of Jiang's had left for Ningbo. The oldest grandson was married and his wife was also doing migrant work. The youngest granddaughter quit school after the seventh grade. Quitting school before finishing junior high is more common among girls than boys, again reflecting patriarchal ideology – it is quite typical in rural China that boys are encouraged, expected and given opportunities to be educated more than girls.

Between their Village G and Ningbo residences, the three generations owned one computer, two televisions, two refrigerators, two washing machines, one motorcycle, one tricycle and more than ten cell phones. When the grandson got married, his wife's family received CNY 16,000 as a brideprice from Jiang. Clearly, earnings from migrant work had enabled the family to maintain a standard of living that was superior to Jiang's prior to his pursuing migrant work. Nevertheless, the cycle of household events financed by remittances, including building or renovating houses and funding sons' weddings, seems to have continued across the generations.

Despite the fact that by 2009 Jiang's son, daughter-in-law and three children were working and/or living in Ningbo, they did not plan to stay there for good. As mentioned earlier, most rural migrants do not plan to live in cities on a permanent basis due to the absence of an identity and future there, socially, economically and institutionally. Both the son and the daughter-in-law indicated that they continued to think of themselves as *nongcunren* or peasants, that they were raised in the village and were happy to live in the village. While such a sentiment may reflect their inability to fully enter urban society rather than a longing for rural living, in their defence the grandson argued that "*Chengshiren* (urbanites) eat three meals a day, so do *nongcunren*."

Household #12

Ding Baopeng (husband) and Yin Yurong (wife) of household #12 are about 20 years younger than Jiang Zhongfeng and Luo Jinying of household #26. However, like Jiang, Ding started migrant work in the early 1980s and he left behind his wife, Yin Yurong (sole migration). Unlike Jiang, Ding was newly married and did not have children when he first started migrant work. Similar to household #26, it was poverty and lack of land that motivated him to work in coalmines in Shanxi. His remittances not only fed the family but also allowed him to buy a tractor in 1992, which motivated him to lease land from other villagers to farm.

However, Yin, who gave birth to two sons in the late 1980s, was practically the only person farming because Ding was absent most of the time. This sole-migration arrangement was a source of frustration for her:

> My husband left home after the Spring Festival and didn't return until the next Spring Festival. I didn't want him to go, but we had no choice. We had too little land and couldn't survive on that. I was left alone, which was really painful. I worked on the farm while my children (ages 5 and 3, around 1992) were crawling everywhere. I could not manage to clear the weed – the boys were crying and clinging to my feet.

Her frustration led her to take the children to join Ding for a short while. While in Shanxi, Yin cooked meals for her husband and other migrant workers. After she returned home, in 1995 Ding decided to return home to farm and leased farmland from other villagers. He explained:

> Migrant work is not a long-term solution. Now that we have the tractor, we can lease farmland from others. We can raise pigs and

> do other odd-jobs... Leaving behind a spouse to take care of the children, farm, raise pigs and chickens is not a good idea. If I stay home, we can manage well all the above.

Yet, in 1999, after four years of farming, the couple concluded that migrant work was necessary for their livelihood. Yin explained: "We lost hope (in the economic situation) at home." But should it be just Ding, both Ding and Yin, or both the couple and their children, who leave home for the city?

By 1999 their children were 11 and 9. Given that migrant children's access to schooling in cities is difficult and is especially so beyond elementary school, Ding and Yin decided to leave their children in rural schools. Their younger son did later attend a migrant children's elementary school in Ningbo, but after a year he had to return home to attend junior high.

As for Yin, Ding was reluctant for her to go out, on the grounds that most wives of the village stay home. But Yin contested and Ding finally compromised. They sold the pigs, sheep and tractor, and they left behind their two sons to be taken care of by Ding's elderly parents. They went to Ningbo, where Ding worked in recycling – a sector that had hired many migrants from Anhui – and Yin worked in a factory.

As a result of Ding and Yin's decision to leave home as a couple, Yin has been seen in the village as a pioneer, starting the practice of the wife doing migrant work and challenging the gendered inside–outside dichotomy. This was just one of many examples where contesting traditional gender norms produces tensions and conflicts, and necessitates negotiation and renegotiation. Having been exposed to urban society and lifestyle, Yin is critical of rural men:

> Urban men are more reasonable. They go home and do chores. Anhui men are no good. They'll earn some money and become full of themselves. Some even get mistresses and divorce their wives.

Yet Yin's contesting traditional gender norms is contradicted by her own endorsement of the notion that major household decisions, including how remittances and savings are used, should be made by men, as seen in another argument between them, described below.

By the mid-2000s, Ding and Yin had used migrant earnings to buy consumer goods such as a television and a washing machine. Yin wanted to invest their savings but Ding wanted to use it for their sons' weddings. Yin described their differences:

> When the town first created a development district, I wanted to spend 20,000 yuan to buy some land there. That piece of land is now worth 40,000 yuan. If we built a two or three-story there, we could have sold it for 80,000 yuan. But my husband is very conservative. He disagreed and wanted to use the savings to build houses for our sons. We had a big fight. Even though the husband should decide on major household matters, I am still mad at him.

Again, Ding's decision to spend the savings on new houses is rooted in the persistent patriarchal tradition where sons are expected to bring in daughters-in-law, and where marital transactions require men to demonstrate their material capacity. From this perspective, using remittances to build houses and preparing sons to get married is not only reasonable but expected. Despite the entrepreneurial soundness and originality of Yin's proposal to buy land, in 2006 Ding decided to spend CNY 150,000 (yuan) to build two houses, one for each son. The same year, the older son, aged 19, joined the husband's recycling work in Ningbo. Three years later, the older son got married, for which Ding and Yin spent CNY 100,000 on the brideprice. They also bought a motorcycle and four cell phones. By 2009, remittances accounted for 100 per cent of the household income. Agriculture contributed nothing because all of the farmland had been leased to other villagers.

The story of Ding and Yin illustrates how the use of remittances has changed over time and how remittances have precipitated both economic and social changes. In the 1980s, remittances were necessary for subsistence. In the 1990s, they were used to invest in agriculture. However, by the late 1990s, the couple had given up on agriculture as a source of livelihood and decided to be completely dependent on migrant work. The use of remittances is situated in gendered traditions that persist in spite of the migrants' exposure to urban living. Yin's participation in migrant work represented her challenging the gendered inside–outside dichotomy. She was one of the pioneers in the village to engage in couple migration, as an alternative to the sole-migration model which left her dissatisfied. Yet she continued to endorse the tradition where the husband is the household head and decision-maker, even though she was critical of him and his decisions. Yin's idea to buy land was original and creative; while Ding's decision was one that reinforced gendered traditions – namely, a man must have a house in order to attract prospective wives and get married. Both Yin's interest in buying land in a nearby town and Ding's decision to build houses in the village show that the countryside remains their home. As long

as the city is out of reach economically, socially and institutionally, a permanent home in the countryside is still necessary.

Conclusion

Using qualitative material about 26 households from a village (Village G) in Anhui, including household biographies and narratives, I have sought to highlight the transformative impacts of remittances on the social and spatial organisation of rural families in China. Over the past 30 years the pursuit of migrant work has redefined the economic and everyday life of the village.

First, remittances are now clearly the main source of income for Village G. Arable land was meagre to begin with; and population increase further eroded any chance of an increase in land allocation per capita and per household. Agriculture's capacity to maintain mere subsistence, let alone savings, is weak. Villagers have given up animal husbandry, and their approach towards arable land is maintenance – hence leasing it to other villagers at no cost – rather than as a productive asset. Instead, migrant work provides practically the only means for villagers to earn non-farm wages and is fast becoming a way of life. Dependence on remittances is the norm. In fact, migrant work is akin to any wage work outside the home, except that the former requires the migrant not to live in the village for extended periods of time.

How remittances are being used is revealing of social norms as well as social and economic changes in rural households. For pioneer migrants who started migrant work in the 1980s, remittances made survival possible and kept the family from being hungry. Also, urban wages funded expensive but necessary items, such as medical bills and house construction or renovation. The house not only provides shelter but is heavily imbued with gendered and intergenerational meanings – a new or expanded house is a prerequisite for the son to find a wife. Due to patriarchal and patrilocal traditions, parents are motivated to support sons' marriage arrangements, often requiring the father to undertake migrant work in order to fund a house project and brideprice. In that light, house-building is not only a social tool but also a practical and necessary step towards continuing the family lineage.

Households that managed to accrue some savings might invest in agriculture, such as buying fertiliser and agricultural machinery. But there is little evidence of commitment to agriculture as a desirable and long-term means of livelihood. Since the 1990s and especially the 2000s, households have increasingly used remittances to invest in children's education. Finally, households may choose to spend their savings on consumer goods, such as washing machines and televisions, signalling not only urban influence but also improvement in the standard of living. Despite the eradication of poverty, the reliance on remittances has not declined but is in fact increasingly the norm across the village. In the rare cases where a household has never participated in migrant work, it is usually because of government appointments such as village officials, or successful entrepreneurial activities.

Migrant work as a way of life is being passed to the children and even the grandchildren, such that two-generation and three-generation migrant households are increasingly common. The younger the migrants, the more likely that they will start migrant work immediately after finishing school, and the more likely that they have not had any farming experience. While the older generation of migrants, especially men, tended to choose sole migration – leaving the spouse and children behind – the new generations are much more ready to undertake newer forms of split households, especially couple migration that involves both spouses. The newer forms of spatial organisation almost always entail intergenerational collaboration and negotiation. The wife of a pioneer migrant, for example, who was responsible for the "inside" under the sole-migrant model may find herself providing care-giving again to her grandchildren so that her children can pursue couple migration. In short, traditional kinship practices of *fenjia* or household division are being postponed in order to facilitate intergenerational collaboration. The reliance on and pursuit of remittances is therefore not simply an economic activity but is a negotiated endeavour that demands new and specific forms of social organisation. In this chapter, I have sought to show how remittances have shaped households' social and spatial organisation, by focusing on the rural family as the site where migration decisions are made and where the impacts of remittances are felt, and allowing biographies and narratives to construct a nascent lifecycle of migrant households.

Appendix A: Household #26

Year	Husband (Jiang Zhongfeng)		Wife (Luo Jinying)		Son		Daugher-in-law		Daughter		Grandson		Grand-daughter-in-law		Grand-daugher		Grand-daughter		Remittance and usage	Household event	Spatial arrange-ment
	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)			
1983	38	Shaanxi (con-struction)	39	Home	15	Home (trans-portation)	16	Home	NA	Home									Subsistence (food, house, medical)	Son got married. Borrowed money to build house for son and fund brideprice. Husband started migrant work	Sole
1993	48	Huainan (coalmine)	49	Home	25	Home (trans-portation)	26	Home	NA	NA	4	Home			2	Home			About CNY 2,000 a year. Built five rooms. Bought a truck for son	Daughter got married and left household	Sole
1994	49	Huainan (coalmine)	50	Home	26	Home (trans-portation)	27	Home			5	Home			3	Home	1	Home		Land adjusted from 5.1 mu to 4.9 mu	Sole
1995	50	Shanghai (con-struction)	51	Home	27	Home (trans-portation)	28	Home			6	Home			4	Home	2	Home	About CNY 4,000 a year, for food, fertiliser, and machinery rental	Installed telephone	Sole
1996	51	Ningbo (con-struction)	52	Home	28	Home (trans-portation)	29	Home			7	Home			5	Home	3	Home			Sole
2000	55	Ningbo (con-struction)	56	Home	32	Ningbo (trans-portation)	33	Ningbo (factory)			11	Home			9	Home	7	Home	Bought washing machine, refrigerator, and colour television	Son sold truck. Both son and daughter-in-law found work in Ningbo	1: Sole; 2: Couple
2005	60	Ningbo (con-struction)	61	Home	7	Ningbo (trans-portation)	38	Ningbo (factory)			16	Ningbo (trans-porta-tion)			14	Home (junior high)	12	Home (ele-mentary)	Remittances were main source of income. Grandchildren's education. Built a second house with six rooms	Grandson finished high school, joined father's work in Ningbo	1: Sole; 2: Couple; 3: Single
2007	62	Home (tricycle business)	63	Home	39	Ningbo (trans-portation)	40	Ningbo (factory)			18	Ningbo (trans-porta-tion)			16	Ningbo (cloth-ing factory)	14	Home (7th grade)		Husband had returned home. Oldest granddaughter joined migrant work in Ningbo. Youngest granddaughter quit school	2: Couple; 3: Single
2009	64	Home (tricycle business)	65	Home	41	Ningbo (trans-portation)	42	Ningbo (factory)			20	Ningbo (trans-porta-tion)	19	NA (migrant work)	18	Ningbo (cloth-ing factory)	16	Ningbo (non-working)	Combined furniture (Ningbo and home): one computer, two televisions, two refrigerators, two washing machines, one motorcycle, one tricycle, more than 10 cell phones. Brideprice for granddaughter-in-law CNY 16,000	Grandson got married. Youngest granddaughter joined family in Ningbo	2: Family; 3: Couple/single

Spatial arrangement: 1: first generation; 2: second generation; 3: third generation.
"Home" includes working in nearby townships, which permits daily commute to and from the village.

Appendix B: Household #12

Year	Husband (Ding Baopeng)		Wife (Yin Yurong)		Son		Daugher-in-law		Son		Remittance and usage	Household event	Spatial arrangement
	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)	Age	Location (work)			
1984	22	Shanxi (colamine)	21	Home							Subsistence (food)	Husband started migrant work	Sole
1987	25	Shanxi (coalmine)	24	Home	0							Birth of son	Sole
1989	27	Shanxi (coalmine)	26	Home	2				0			Birth of son	Sole
1992	30	Shanxi (coalmine)	29	Home	5				3		Bought a tractor	Leased farmland from villagers	Sole
1993	31	Shanxi (coalmine)	30	Shanxi (home making)	6	Shanxi			4	Shanxi		Wife and two sons joined husband	Family
1994	33	Shanxi (coalmine)	32	Home	8	Home			6	Home	Earned CNY 5,000 in one year. Bought fertiliser, bicycle, tape recorder		Sole
1995	34	Home	33	Home	9	Home			7	Home		Husband returned home to farm and lease farmland from villagers	Non-migrant
1999	37	Ningbo (recycling)	36	Ningbo (factory)	12	Home			10	Home		Both husband and wife found work in Ningbo. Sold agricultural machinery, all sheep and pigs. Husband's parents (70+) took care of two children	Couple
2001	40	Ningbo (recycling)	39	Ningbo (factory)	15	Home			13	Ningbo (Migrant children's school)		Younger son attended migrant children's school in Ningbo. Returned home after one year	Partial family
2004	42	Ningbo (recycling)	41	Ningbo (factory)	17	Home			15	Home	Television	Older son graduated from junior high	Couple
2005	43	Ningbo (recycling)	42	Ningbo factory)	18	Nanjing (Learning to drive)			16	Home	Bought washing machine. Bought CNY 20,000 worth of bricks to build houses for two sons	Older son stayed with uncle in Nanjing to learn to drive	1: Couple; 2: Single
2006	44	Ningbo (recycling)	43	Ningbo (factory)	19	Ningbo (recycling)			17	Home	Spent CNY 150,000 to build two houses	Older son joined parents in Ningbo	1: Couple; 2: Single
2009	47	Ningbo (recycling)	46	Ningbo (factory)	22	Ningbo (recycling)	22	Just married	20	Home	Brideprice CNY 100,000. Other properties: motorcycle, four cell phones	Older son got married. Younger son graduated from junior high	1: Couple; 2: Couple

Spatial arrangement: 1: first generation; 2: second generation; 3: third generation.
"Home" includes working in nearby townships, which permits daily commute to and from the village.

Notes

1. The notion of "men till, women weave" has long been considered the norm for the gender division of labour in the countryside, although it inaccurately portrays Chinese women as absent from the field even though they have made significant contribution to agriculture (Entwisle and Henderson, 2000: 298; Hershatter, 2000).
2. Their oldest child, who was 21 in 2009, was married to a wife aged 23. They seemed exceptionally young to have two children aged eight and two. I suspect that the eight-year-old was adopted.

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9

Filipino Children and the Affective Economy of Saving and Being Saved: Remittances and Debts in Transnational Migrant Families

Cheryll Alipio

In 2006 over 50 million migrants from the Asia-Pacific region sent home more than USD 113 billion in remittances (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2007). Six years later and 10 million more migrant workers worldwide, these remittances had more than doubled to USD 260 billion, representing 63 per cent of global flows to all developing countries (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2013). With the scale and scope of remittances and migrants from the Asia-Pacific region continuing to comprise the highest regional total in the world, not only are an estimated 70 million Asian households – that is, one out of every ten – benefiting from these financial flows (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2013) in terms of subsistence, poverty alleviation and economic mobility (Massey et al., 1993) but also national governments and their GDP, where the amount of remittances have far exceeded the value of official development assistance and foreign direct investment in countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Indonesia (Rosewarne, 2012). In the Philippines, the inflow of over USD 21.4 billion (nearly 12 per cent of GDP) in 2012 (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), 2014) and outflow of almost 4.28 million migrants in 2010 solidifies the country as the third largest remittance recipient in the world which, in terms of Southeast Asia, accounts for over half of all remittances (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2013) and leads as a migrant-sending country to top destinations such as the USA, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, Italy, Qatar, the UAE and the UK (World Bank, 2011).