No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia

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Macedonia’s centrality to the making of Greece over the past century provides the empirical grounding for an exploration of how cultural-symbolic borrowing rather than cross-border othering has been crucial for border making in Modern Greece and, by extension, everywhere in the world. There has been a recent revival in studies of borders between states and what they mean in relation to both the history of state formation and the effects of globalization on state power. Typically, however, the borders between modern “nation-states” are seen as originating in cross-pressures between pairs of neighboring states just the same in Africa today as, say, in nineteenth-century France. The wider contemporary geographical context may be invoked in terms of the “sides” taken in particular border disputes by other nearby states or by the Great Powers. Rarely, however, is the wider historical-geopolitical context invoked as the primary source of the practices, simultaneously material and symbolic, that produce the desire for precise borders in the first place. With increased globalization, however, the making of Greece in Macedonia may become increasingly problematic because the political logic of all national border-making is increasingly in question. Key Words: borders, Greece, nationalism, Macedonia, statehood.

Worldwide, it is hard to find a single international border that has not been inspired by the example and practices of an originally Western European statehood (De Vorsay and Biger 1995; Burghardt 1996). Much border making has been the direct result of the imposition and subsequent breakup of European empires outside of Europe into statelike units. But it has also been more broadly the result of the spread of a model of territorial statehood and state-centered political economy from Western Europe into the rest of the world. At the same time both a political ideal and set of sociopolitical practices, the imagination of territorial statehood rests on imitation and diffusion of established political models that define what is and what is not possible in the world at any particular time and in any particular place. European (and, later, American) cultural hegemony has thus “written the script” for the growth and consolidation of a global nation-state system (e.g., Meyer 1999). The model of statehood has had as its central geographical moment the imposition of sharp borders between one state unit (imagined as a nation-state, however implausible that usually may be) and its neighbors. Previously in world history a wide range of types of polity coexisted without any one—empire, city-state, nomadic network, dynastic state, or religious polity—serving as the singular model of “best political practice.” It is only with the rise of Europe to global predominance that an idealized European territorial state became the global archetype.

This is not to say that there has been no “local” initiative at all to “nation-state” making—far from it. A wide array of locally-specific practices and influences invariably enter into the process, from fighting wars, drawing maps, and organizing ministries to forming alliances, issuing decrees, and building schools. But emphasizing one or more of such factors by themselves, as is typical of most writing about state formation, has downplayed the degree to which states are cultural constructions invented out of practices and symbols imported from elsewhere more than the result of an everywhere identical instrumental reason or rational choice (Steinmetz 1999) or a worldwide cultural evolution. In particular, certain early-developed European territorial states, France and England especially, have served as both the primary sources and subsequent audiences for the definition of a “successful” polity in the modern world. That this polity should take the form of a rigidly territorialized nation-state in the European style has gone largely without saying (Winichakul 1994; Duara 1995).

Not surprisingly, therefore, in studying borders the wider geographical frame of reference has often been lost as the particular origins of the border between this and that nation-state have taken center stage and then, if often subtly, generalized to all others. Additionally, the presumed functionality of all borders drawn from the example of a “typical” one (often France) has occluded much sense of what all might have in common because of their specific relationship to projections of the
quintessential European “experience” that they are now repeating. Certainly, many of the now classic writings on borders (e.g., Minghi 1963; Prescott 1987) and more recent influential accounts (Sahlins 1989; M. Anderson 1996) have tended to adopt these more limited perspectives, whatever their other, often important, differences. Of course, this failure is symptomatic of the more general difficulty of modern social science in “thinking outside the conceptual and material grasp of the modern state” (Abraham and van Schendel 2005, 10; Chernilo 2006).

In this article, I first briefly examine and critique the mechanical “cross-pressure” view of borders, arguing that this approach reflects a commonsense understanding among many scholars that borders are invariably the outcome of preexisting definitions of national identity. They are either a primordial or a constructed result, depending on theoretical predilection, of the distinctions that national groups already draw between themselves and neighboring ones. In other words, borders always follow nations. I then turn to an alternative account that focuses on how actors in specific cases are both inspired by and invoke arguments about the functions of borders that apply ideal typical European models of statehood to their circumstances. From this viewpoint, borders are primarily the result of cultural borrowing about how states should be laid out. By this cultural definition a state without rigid and rigorously controlled borders is not much of a state. Borders thus make the nation rather than vice versa. This general argument is then illustrated by showing how the Balkan region of Macedonia has figured for the past century in the making of Greece as a modern nation-state: first with respect to the Greek story about Macedonia as charted in a historical narrative of the relationship between the region and the making of Modern Greece and, second, in terms of a theoretically informed analysis of elements of the broader geographical, specifically European, context in which the historical claims of Greece to the region have evolved. I end by briefly examining the idea that the making of Greece in Macedonia is now coming up against a limit in a world in which both material political-economic pressures and an old European discourse about borders no longer conspire to reproduce long-established bordering practices.

Borders as Othering versus Borders as Borrowing

“Dear God,
Who draws the lines around the countries?

—(Hample and Marshall, Children’s Letters to God, 1991)

At one time borders were understood simply as boundary lines between self-evident states whose existence was presumed to reflect physical features or international treaties and which, in a somewhat later conventional wisdom, served various economic or social “functions.” The more recent literature on borders has attended much more closely to how borders are socio-territorial constructs reflecting the discourses and practices of national identity and bordering under conditions of globalization (Paasi 2005; van Houtum 2005; van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer 2005; Newman 2006; Rumford, forthcoming). Yet, whether naturalistic or post-structuralist in conception, most border studies still tend to conceive of borders in cross-pressure terms. The emphasis on cross-pressures across a border between adjacent states both making and maintaining it in place reflects a completely territorialized image of spatiality in which territorialized states are seen as monopolizing the geography of power when, as is well known, power can be deployed spatially in various networked as well as territorial forms.2 Once it was “forces” and “functions” that constituted the moments of cross-pressure, whereas it is now “discourses” and “practices.” What remains largely, if not entirely, the same in empirical practice is the emphasis on “the philosophy and practices of b/ordering and othering” (van Houtum 2005, 674), if not now just at the physical border, but also about the border as a regimen of territorial control outside of immediate borderlands (e.g., passport regulation at airports, visa checking at workplaces, etc.) That bordering has been so powerfully about borrowing rather than about cross-border othering elicits no comment.

Rather than recounting the history of border studies or providing yet another typology of cross-border studies (see, e.g., Kolossov 2005), I would just mention one study that has been widely influential in border studies and that is often seen as representing a radical departure from “old-style” studies based on center-periphery and top-down understandings of how borders come about and are maintained. Indeed, in his widely cited and influential book, Sahlins (1989, 7) does not at first reading provide the epitome of a cross-pressure perspective. He is particularly critical of what he calls the “received wisdom” that “modern nations were built from political centers outwards.” In its place, he argues that “the dialectic of local and national interests . . . produced the boundaries of national territory” (p. 8). In turn, “acceptance meant giving up local identities and territories” (p. 8) as “local society brought the nation into the
village" (p. 9). Though confused about how “ancient” (p. 4) or recent “the conception of a linear political boundary” (p. 6) actually is, he is nevertheless clear that it is instrumental, totalistic, and oppositional. His archetypal border, that between France and Spain in the Pyrenees, was based on the “nationalization of interest” (p. 155) as “national identities were grounded in the affirmation and defense of social and territorial boundaries against outsiders” (p. 269) and as “village communities, peasants and nobles, made use of the national state and its boundaries” (p. 276). All this, of course, only happened because political entities called “France” and “Spain” provided the alternative repertoires of interests and identities around which the border between the two was defined. So, although Sahlins emphasizes the local sources of the interstate border, as opposed to complete imposition on the locals implied by the more typical stories of border making, the border is itself viewed as the direct result of cross-pressures on identities and interests. The local sources are thus mobilized as a supplement to these forces from over-the-horizon as the local places within a border-segment in the Cerdagne/Cerdanya between France and Spain, on which he focuses in his historical study, were incorporated into the two countries. Concomitantly, he is leery of the association between nationalism as a collective political ideology and border-making, preferring to see borders in strictly rational-instrumental rather than in cultural-symbolic terms. In this way he can date commitment to borders long before the nineteenth century when nationalism first became the widespread phenomenon it is today.

This oppositional model of identity is hardly unique to border studies such as that of Sahlins or others. Indeed, a case could be made that it is a dominant element in a wide range of types of contemporary social science and political theory that rely theoretically on “othering” as their main socio-geographical mechanism (see, e.g., Cohen 1986; Gregory 2004; Bahry et al. 2005). Territorial social formations are seen as the root of all identities. The boundaries (including borders) between them are then viewed as defined by opposing and exclusionary identities that preexisted the coming of the borders. Thus, nation-states are assimilated to a notion of social boundaries of which their borders are simply just another, if frequently more fundamental or definitional, exemplar. Yet exactly the opposite process has often been closer to the norm with respect to the relationship between identity and borders: national identities have been crafted after borders are more or less in place by ethnic cleansing or expulsions, forced assimilation, and other planned or spontaneous but usually violent efforts at cultural homogenization by central authorities and their local agents (Rae 2002; Mann 2005).

Two very different versions of the oppositional model can be distinguished with crucial consequences for how social boundaries in general and state borders in particular are conceived (Abizadeh 2005). The stronger version, the one that currently prevails in much writing about boundaries and borders, rests on the assumption that opposition between preexisting groups is necessarily total, adversarial, and, typically, asymmetric. From this point of view, national identities become mutually exclusive through antagonism and hostility, or what Carl Schmitt (1985), in a particularly influential account, called the “friend-enemy” relation. In this way national identities must transcend local or nonterritorial ones (based on class, religion, or other status markers), particularly for dominant (or potentially so) nation-states. They do so by defining hard borders against discrete enemies (Shapiro 2004, 123). In this way, politics are reduced to “definitive identifications” (Shapiro 2004, 133). The weaker version, which considers opposition between discrete groups as contributory to rather than definitional of identity, also understands that any group, weak or strong, needs to set limits to membership but that exclusion is neither necessarily antagonistic nor invariably territorial. After all, many identities are relatively labile and not mutually exclusive of others (Shoemaker 1997, 2004; Agnew 2003; Green 2005; Bahry et al. 2005; Fuchs 2005). Many people everywhere have relatively complex identities—across and among class, ethnic, gender, and other divisions—that only under extreme circumstances, particularly when forced violently by political activists into taking sides, are redefined in singular terms. In other words, “otherness” in the sense of cultural or political difference is rarely the outcome of us/them othering in Schmitt’s sense of territorially-defined absolute friends and enemies. To think that Schmitt is correct is to simply universalize the peculiarly virulent enmity that he felt, one of the twentieth century’s Great Haters, in his time and place, Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, about Germans versus Jews and Germans versus others, onto the world at large (Botwinick 2005; although see Ojakangas 2005, 37).

At the same time, many academic accounts of nationalism, in focusing exclusively on, say, vernacular literacy, ethnic symbolism, or national self versus other, also assume that once an exclusive national identity is achieved it is readily perpetuated within the national population (e.g., B. Anderson 1983; Greenfeld 1992). A border is then defined around the national groups in question. This assumption misses what is precisely one of the main sources of the political strength of nationalism:
that being perpetually in question, national identity has to be constantly reinvented through the mobilization of national populations (or significant segments thereof). Borders, because they are at the edge of the national-state territories, provide the essential focus for such collective uncertainty (Goemans 2006). Even as defined strictly, therefore, but by also remaining in perpetual question, state borders provide the center of attention for more generalized elite, and sometimes popular, anxiety about what still remains to be achieved by the state for the nation (Krishna 1994; Zimmer 2003). Both the journey to statehood and the anxiety it engenders, however, are not directly defined by the borders themselves. They reflect the aspirations and fears of an everyday nationalism in which whole populations are thought of (and they think of themselves) as if they move and think as one. In this construction, the “national economy” and the “national character” are likewise presumed to represent a transparently obvious collective identity and interest associated intimately with a culturally homogenizing and territorialized national space. It is this reified discourse, therefore, that needs explaining, not the borders per se.

The everyday nationalism in which borders are implicated as central moments, then, is not a project that simply takes place at the border or between adjacent states (Paasi 1996). Indeed, it is only secondarily territorial in that its origins often lie in distant centers and in scattered diasporas where elites and activists engage in the task of defining and defending what they understand as the nation-state’s borders, the better to imagine the shape or geo-body of their nation. Two elite groups are especially influential: “In the formation of national states, the task of intellectuals seems in fact to be that of providing arguments (historical, geographical, political) to sustain the idea that a [national] frontier exists. The role of politicians is to transform the affirmed frontier into a political-administrative border” (Vereni 1996, 80).

The distinction between social frontier (boundary, in more typical usage) and state border is analytic. In practice the two become fused as the simple “mental map” conjured up by the latter and its material enforcement of “checkpoints” on the ground comes to dominate the complexities of the former (Migdal 2004). State borders are not, therefore, simply just another example of, albeit more clearly marked, boundaries. They are qualitatively different in their capacity to both redefine other boundaries and to override more locally-based distinctions (Anderson and O’Dowd 1999; Rumford, forthcoming). They also have a specific historical and geographical origin. If social boundaries are universal and transcendental, although varying in their incidence and precise significance, state borders, in the sense of definitive borderlines, certainly are not. They have not been around for time immemorial (see, e.g., Whittaker 1994; Ellenblum 2002). Attempts to claim that bordering is historic in the sense of unequivocal and definite delimitation or to take bordering as a given of state formation are, therefore, empirically problematic.

What is evident has been the need to give borders a deep-seated historical genealogy: if not for the ones around here, for those over there, which “we” are now duplicating (Fevre 1928; Whittaker 1994; Agnew 2001; M. Smith 2005).

The model of statehood that the boundary/border distinction relies on is in fact one that was only slowly established beginning in parts of Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and that has since spread worldwide (Agnew 2001, 7–22; Jesné 2004). The very idea of a “model” of anything is very much a product of the same period. Toulmin (1990, 35) shows that between 1610 and 1650 many leading European intellectuals, such as Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton, saw rationalism—the divorce of human reason from the details of place and time—as a necessary and revolutionary response to the religious wars and crises of governance of the times. A universal language of reason would provide general justifications for what had previously been seen as particular and local phenomena. In particular, one of the most important requirements in constructing the new “cosmopolis” was to abandon the overlapping jurisdictions and mixed modes of political authority that had previously characterized Europe. This was undoubtedly underwritten by the pressure to improve revenue collection in pursuit of improved military capacity in an age of religious wars (Tilly 1994) and the need to legitimize the territorial centralization of a wide range of administrative practices (Loveman 2005); but the novelty of the nature of the cultural logic deserves underlining.6 Ipso facto, borders between states would henceforth be defined in the boldest and most rigorous form rather than left deliberately fuzzy.

As a universalistic logic of clear definition replaced a particularistic conception of accumulated local practice, definitive maps of the new European states began to appear. One consequence, as Biggs (1999, 396) has it, was that “The land was now literally cut into pieces by state boundaries: Each piece could be held in isolation from its geographical context.” Also, in this way, “Putting the state on the map meant knowing and imagining it as real—and, so, making it a reality” (Biggs 1999, 399). Eventually, and well beyond Europe, as Neocleous (2003, 418) notes,
Sovereignty does not simply imply space, it creates it; left to itself, the earth has no political form. We need to therefore appreciate the political function of maps in constructing rather than merely reproducing the world and in creating rather than merely tracing borders. Borders are constructed through a socio-political process; to the extent that the map helps create the borders, so it helps create the thing which is being bordered: the geo-body created literally on paper.

This visualization was encouraged by developments in political philosophy that saw no political space in the “state of nature” but authorized it solely under the rigorous bounding of absolute authority (as in Hobbes), private property (as in Locke), or the general will (as in Rousseau) as sanctioned by the social contract. Thus emergent political territory not only separated the modern polity from the feudal, but did so by “creating a territorial grounding within which constitutional discourse and political exchange could take place” (Neocleous 2003, 410).

Formalized with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and then boosted by the American and French Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century with their stress on territorial/national unity, in imitation of classical references drawn from democratic Athens and republican Rome bestowed uniquely on Europe, the model state was a rigidly territorial enterprise. To put this somewhat differently, “The form of sovereign power that developed in Europe from the sixteenth century onward conceived space as bounded. ‘Sovereignty,’ like ‘state,’ implies ‘space,’ and control of a territory becomes the foundation of sovereignty” (Neocleous 2003, 411). As a result, for the ideal-type modern state there can be neither overlaps in authority nor ambiguity in sovereignty. Borders are brought into existence to hinder overlap and ambiguity. Consequently, cultures are thought of as naturally integral and territorial. Territory, the putative solution to the early-modern European crisis in political authority, thus became the leitmotif of modern “nation”-statehood everywhere. Politically ambitious elites with claims on national genealogies were drawn to the territorial model of statehood as the means for realizing their ambitions. Such “political transfer” subsequently became a long-run feature of even the most modest of institutional innovations throughout Europe (e.g., Jacoby 2000; Pombeni 2005).

The elevation of the myth of a necessarily territorialized statehood into a future perfect of political organization is hardly the end of the story, however. What it misses most powerfully is the impact of the nineteenth-century turn from absolute universalism to the universalizing of the particular under Romanticism. In this manifestation, the state, now invariably hyphenated with the nation, “became the necessary form of civilized social organization. The consequently more obvious political fragmentation of Europe became the oxymoron of its fundamental unity, just as ‘individualism’ became the equally paradoxical criterion of social conformity; and in the most radical undermining of the universalist agenda, many a culture appointed itself the touchstone of European identity” (Herzfeld 1987, 81).

Crucially, time, in the sense of the historical contingency that had produced this or that state, was thus fatefully obscured by an emphasis on the now permanent territoriality of nation-statehood as the culmination of history (Pécou 2004). “Historical rights” to occupy a territory, and usually to expand it, were based on claims of first occupancy or on the central importance to national identity of a particular territory or of sites within it (Neocleous 2003, 410).

The exceptional character of Europe, therefore, as inherited from the ancient Greeks and Romans (and also, when laudable, each nation’s own primordial ancestors) sanctioned the construction of absolute borders to distinguish each offspring’s claims to superiority from the others (Schiavone 2000; Agnew 2001). Yet the new borders were not simply a recapitulation of the “limits” of the ancients but ones that are always potentially labile in an increasingly dynamic (and capitalist) world. In the words of Aldo Schiavone (2000, 205–6), quoting Marx’s Grundrisse,

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The revolution of modernity meant, above all, abolishing limits—sweeping away not only the obstacles that had blocked ancient civilizations, but also the very nature of limit as an insuperable barrier and the belief that cyclicality was destiny. Boundaries were transformed into movable frontiers, continually shifted forward. The new forms of labor and science set potentialities in motion, ensuring that the history of the Western world would never again attempt ‘to remain something it has become’ (as in Aristides’ idea of an eternal empire). Instead it would begin to be identified with ‘the absolute movement of becoming’ (as in our common sense notion that there is nothing that does not change).

The model of absolute territorial nation-statehood has only worked effectively, if at all, if large parts of national populations, at least for much of the time, participate in the everyday nationalism that is centered to a significant degree on the journey toward and the anxiety engendered by the fixing of borders. As Foucault (1980, 98) emphasized, modern subjectivity is intimately related to the development of modern statehood and its
All sorts of localized segmentary social relations, semia' as individuals and groups challenge and violate views become subject to "semantic lability" and "diesemia" as individuals and groups challenge and violate establishment terminology and rules (Herzfeld 1987, 154). All sorts of localized segmentary social relations, resting on familial, ethnic, and residential ties, can conflict with state-endorsed repertoires of political and social behavior. It is in borderlands, places most symbolic of the achievements of nationhood because that is where the nation is most subject to cartographic anxiety (Krishna 1994), that the persistence and/or efflorescence of cultural variety are subject to the most systematic assault from centralized power (Anzaldua 1987; Brady 2000). Such regions also acquire a mythic dimension insofar as they evoke hybridity and the possibilities of the chaos that could engulf the nation as a whole if such complex identities spread elsewhere (Stokes 1998).

Nevertheless, everyday or "banal" nationalism ultimately has a corrosive impact on nonstatist political proclivities as the anxieties of individuals are conflated with those of the nation. As Ernest Renan (1990, 11) famously alleged in his classic essay of 1882, "the essence of the nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things." This emphasis on forgetting or on what cannot now be said is crucial (Bruner 2005, 315–18). It draws attention to the selective retention of past social affiliations as people rhetorically fit them into the dominant narratives of the nation. As the fate of individuals, therefore, is inexorably tied to that of the nation-state, the segmentary logic of nation-statehood itself is revealed. The very claim to distinctiveness that underpins everyday nationalism needs to be constantly revisited and reinforced. The national stereotypes on which claims to cultural distinctiveness rely are notoriously unrelated empirically to the actual personality traits of the "national" individuals to whom they allegedly apply (Terracciano et al. 2005). Yet, they persist because they are constantly repeated in national media, school textbooks and lessons, and in everyday conversations.

The borders of the nation-state are crucial to this job, even if only symbolically by designating where "We" begin and "They" end, as they also incessantly threaten to give way before overwhelming flows of outsiders and foreign influences. "Borders are fungible" (Brady 2000, 173), in the sense of performative phenomena that while giving the popular impression of total barriers must balance the contradictory tasks of allowing movement across them and enforcing territorial order. Consequently, border crises or threats to their integrity are fundamental to national self-definition. Borders have to be brought to mind often at great distances from where they are performed in order to bring to mind who is inside and who is outside their scope. This is how nations are imagined as tangible entities that have an existence beyond the mere aggregation of the people who make them up. By extension, therefore, from this viewpoint there can be no nation without borders; the former follows from the latter. At the same time, it has always been a "fallacy that one has to go to the border to encounter it" (Serematakis 1996, 490). Borders are kit and caboodle, then, to everyday nationalism.

**“Territorial Hysteria”: Making Modern Greece in Macedonia**

Happy countries have no history.

—Antonio Salazar, Portuguese dictator

The imitation of statehood began at Europe’s margins partly through local initiative but mainly through the stimulation and recognition of the European Great Powers (e.g., Tuma 1971; Bernal 1987). In one respect Europe’s eastern and southern margins constituted a resource “periphery” for the capitalist “core” of Western Europe, as argued by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). But a philosophical geography already posited such regions as lacking in the attributes needed for self-confident, locally generated statehood. These had little if anything to do with economic development per se but reflected the taint of despotism imported from the Ottoman and Russian Empires and, in the case of Southern Europe, the need for a renewed reconquista for an idealized “Europe” of places that were clearly identified as the seats of that very European civilization. In other words, in the “mind of the Enlightenment,” to use Wolff’s (1994) turn of phrase, and as expressed by such later
intellectual luminaries as Montesquieu and Hegel, “The South is what Europe, simply, was” (Dainotto 2000, 383). If in one interpretation, in particular that of Montesquieu, a fallen South stood in need of rescue by a progressive North, in another, for example that of Rousseau, the South represented an “older” Europe that had to be reincorporated to fulfill a European identity grounded in “multiplicity” (Dainotto 2000, 385–7). In both cases, to complete Europe as a region defined as a multiplicity of states and as a balance of power, these southern places were to be the showcase in which the initial universalizing of the European model of statehood would take place.

The Ottoman and Austrian Empires that long ruled in Southeastern Europe never insisted on cultural and linguistic unification. Their rule also varied in its directness and effectiveness from place to place (Jesné 2004). If in Western Europe the quintessential states such as France and England preexisted their respective nations, in Southeastern Europe “the idea of the national sovereign state was imported from the west by the growing middle classes born in the empires or on their periphery” (Jesné 2004, 166). The arrival of the modern territorial state in this region (as in most of the world beyond Western Europe), therefore, has always involved drawing borders across complex ethnic settlement patterns and sometimes using anachronistic arguments about the present-day national affiliations of long-gone polities (such as the ancient Macedonian Empire, an ancient Hindustan, or the ancient Israelites) to justify who should control a given territory and the naming rights to it. A chronological narrative of the role of Macedonia in the making of a Modern Greek nation-state provides a vivid example of the way in which borders crucially enter into the very definition of nationhood.

In the Greek case, the desire to construct a state came initially from the Greek commercial diaspora scattered around the Mediterranean and Black Seas and in the cities of Central and Western Europe allied to the romantic aspiration, shared with “philhellenic” Western intellectuals (most famously England’s Lord Byron), to liberate Balkan Christians from the Ottoman Turks and, hopefully, to reestablish the glory of ancient Greece. If there was a concentration of identifiably Greek people living in the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula, many if not most Greeks (of either linguistic or religious qualification) lived scattered well beyond this territory. Of course, quite what constituted a “Greek” as opposed to a Balkan Christian or even a Turkish Christian remained very much in doubt. As Greece was made, so were the Greeks.

The numerous popular revolts against the Ottomans over the years had never taken a national cast until the early nineteenth century but even then the first Modern Greek state was a largely foreign enterprise financed by Britain and France and in the hands of a Bavarian prince and administrators. Only in 1843, following a coup d’état by the Greek army caste that had been recruited from the klephtes, irregular fighters or bandits against the Ottomans, did a more truly Greek state begin to emerge—one now armed with a powerful mythic origin in peasant revolt. At that time, however, the Greek state only covered the southern part of the state as constituted today (Figure 1A). The then northern border was decided by French and British diplomats to “arbitrarily include the places that figured in [their] historic reminders” (Jesné 2004, 168) of the region as it had been in classical times and to further their policy of slowly dismembering the Ottoman Empire. A Renaissance-era imagination of Greece as a compact zone on the southwestern edge of the Sultan’s empire had created an expanded perception of Greek territory that covered “almost the entire Balkan peninsula, part of Asia Minor, sometimes Cyprus, and even Sicily and southern Italy” (Tolias 2001, 15). In this way, historic association and present occupancy became fatefully fused (and confused) in a cartographic representation “justifying the ‘liberation’ of the territories concerned and their annexation to Greece” (Tolias 2001, 15). At the same time, various apparently distinguishable groups in and around the borders of the state (particularly “Albanians” and “Vlachs,” the largely Hellenized speakers of a language akin to Romanian) were accused of “brigandage” that Turkish misrule was held to have passed on to them. They could be Balkan Christians but only as Hellenized Greeks could they be rescued from their outsider status. Until this happened, they were the aliens against whom Greek nationhood could be most readily defined (Tzanelli 2002).

To push beyond their dependent status and to live up to the nationalist imagination of a Greece that included most Greeks within its compass and that was “true” to its Hellenic genealogy, Greek nationalists used their fusion of ethnic and historical arguments to justify territorial expansion. By the late nineteenth century this was part of what has been called a “territorial hysteria” (Bibó 1986) as Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Macedonian Slavs (and others) all strove to carve out nation-states for themselves from the European rump of the Ottoman Empire. Guerrilla warfare in Ottoman Macedonia between 1904 and 1908 and the subsequent two Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 saw major efforts at expanding the
northern borders of Greece. At the time, the local peasants were still immersed in religious and regional identities. In order to reply to the game of terror initiated by the Bulgarian bands, the Greek struggle aimed at forcing Exarchist peasants [followers of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church] to revert to the Patriarchate [the Greek Orthodox Church], and to protect those who still adhered to it. In doing so, the element of violence was essential. “Nationalism,” whatever that meant in the early 20th century, rested on the barrel of a gun. Violence proved the only way of securing the allegiance of the peasants.

—(Livanios 1999, 220)

The role of violence in creating modern ethnic identities in Macedonia is evident in anecdotes such as the following gathered by an international inquiry into the brutalities of the Balkan Wars:

The fugitives from Strumnitsa are simple people. One man spoke rather naively of his first horror at the idea of leaving his native place. Later, he said, he had acquiesced; he supposed the authorities knew best. Another fugitive, a village priest, regretted his home, which had, he said, the best water in all Macedonia. But he was sure flight was wise. He had reason to fear the Bulgarians. A comitadji early in the first war pointed a rifle at his breast, and said: “Become a Bulgarian, or I’ll kill you.” He forthwith became a Bulgarian for several months and conformed to the exarchist church.


It was precisely the fluidity of ethnicity and its complex relationship to kinship, class, trading, religion, and attachment to place in a region where many people were multilingual (if just as frequently illiterate in any language) and national preference had hitherto not been of primary significance (Schein 1975; Mazower 1996; Hart 1999; Gounaris 2001; Detrez 2003) that made the conflicts so bloody. More specifically, and writing of the district of Monastir (Bitola) in the early 1900s

Urbanization (and emigration) in the era of nationalism had broken a tradition which was characterized by loyalty to church, family, clan, and village; secret organizations offered young men living outside their clans and away from their villages an alternative point of reference and support. Yet the idea of a nation was a long way off. The traditional cultural division of labor kept Slavs in the fields and Vlachs in the markets.

—(Gounaris 2001, 59–60)

The heterogeneity of the region, not just with respect to the distribution of discrete ethnicities but, more important, with respect to shared social practices and linguistic hybridity, as represented by the fruit salad that has become a well-known trope of Macedonia in a number of languages, worked against the drawing of clear borderlines. In this context, local people had to be forced by politically dominant nationalist activists into choosing sides.11
On the Greek side, a Hellenic ideal of past cultural greatness in need of discovery and revival was the overwhelming thrust of the cultural redefinition involved in the process of popular recruitment to the national cause (Herzfeld 1982; Peckham 2001; Bien 2005). From this viewpoint, Byzantine and Ottoman influences had corrupted the ancient mores. Local folklore studies (dances, music, clothing, etc.) were used to both reveal and teach how the “masses belonging to the nation or ethnos” (Peckham 2001, 67). Capturing Macedonia was particularly important in this endeavor. Not only would this bring together ancient and Byzantine conceptions of the Greek nation, thus reconciling the Church and the modern nation, it also justified a popular imperialism in which modern Greece was tied historically to Alexander the Great through the potential occupation of his homeland. Out of this confluence developed a romantic Hellenism in which Macedonia was defined as the “lung of Greece” and its possible “loss” as a mutilation (Dragounis 1907; Vakalopoulos 1987). In this construction, Macedonia was potentially a repository of ancient Greek ideals as well as a pocket of cultural pollution. Paradoxically, therefore, it was at one and the same time both vital to the nation and a threat to its integrity.

Macedonia is the historic name for a large area that was shared following the border delimitations after the First World War between Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia. It comprises the watershed of the Vardar River with the two main cities of Salonica in northeastern Greece and Skopje in Yugoslavia providing the communication and transportation axis through the region. The region was populated predominantly with Slavo-Macedonians and Bulgarians at the time of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), although the cosmopolitan city of Salonica, with its large Jewish, Muslim, and Greek populations, was exceptional (Mazower 2004). Macedonia’s division into Pirin (Bulgarian), Vardar (Serbian), and Aegean (Greek) segments left a significant Slav-Macedonian population in Greek Macedonia, particularly in rural areas and in and around Florina in the west. The fervently held nationalist goal of incorporating the whole of Macedonia into Greece came up against a complex local reality that long seemed to challenge the ideal. The border now ran through a potential zone of expansion rather than simply delimited the limit of a territorial claim (Figure 1B). For a time Greek territorial claims in Macedonia became increasingly inseparable from a vision of a Greek state that would incorporate Crete, Macedonia, the Aegean islands, Cyprus, the west coast of Asia Minor, Constantinople (Istanbul), and areas around the Black Sea. Rather like the analogous claim to a Greater Serbia devoted to uniting all Serbs under one government, the image of Greater Greece (known as the Great Idea) was to lead to disastrous wars against the Turks first in 1897 and then, most devastatingly, in 1922. Such an expansive irredentism was at the root of Greek “cartographic anxiety” from the founding of the state down to the 1920s (Peckham 2001, 40). With so many potential Greeks scattered beyond the territorial limits of the state, the possibility of incorporating all of them in a territorial form was always problematic. The initial success in Macedonia compared to failure in many other places was to be reinforced, therefore, when in the aftermath of the failed attempt at expanding into Asia Minor in 1922, the Orthodox Christian population of Anatolia was exchanged for much of the Muslim population of mainland Greece, with the majority of the transplants to Greece settling in Greek Macedonia. In this way a Macedonia still ambiguously Greek at best was ethnicized or made increasingly Greek by the transfusion of refugees (Pentzopoulos 2002; Hirschon 2003).

Uncertainty about the Greek status of Macedonia, however, did not disappear (Figure 1C). Indeed, with the incorporation of only one part of the historic region into Greece, Macedonia became, if anything, even more central to the self-definition of the nation. In the 1930s authoritarian Greek governments attempted to impose a cultural uniformity in Greek Macedonia by forbidding the use of languages other than Greek and denying the contemporary existence of any degree of regional ethnic heterogeneity. In the aftermath of the Second World War, when Greece had been invaded and devastated by the Axis powers of Italy and Germany, a Communist insurgency broke out against the Royalist Greek government as it returned home from exile. The Greek Civil War came to be as much about the “Macedonian Question” as it was about a change of government in Greece as a whole (Jones 1989, 66–67, 200–1, 222–23). Particularly in its later phase, as the insurgents were forced into pockets near the Albanian and Yugoslav borders, the issue of the political future of Macedonia divided the Communist leadership as one group attempted to mobilize Slav-Macedonian support by backing an autonomous Macedonia that would then join Yugoslavia. Of course, by this time the great majority of people in Greek Macedonia saw themselves as ethnically Greek, so this meant largely abandoning whatever support they may have offered. Splits among the Communists in 1949 over whether to back a Yugoslav or Bulgarian association and successive defeats following the fateful adoption of a conventional military posture that played into the hands of the U.S.-supported Greek
army led to an ever greater reliance on non-Greek recruits. Many people who fought on the Communist side or who found themselves targets of Greek government revenge, including their families or just their children, left Greek Macedonia as the war wound down. Most never returned home, either staying in Yugoslav Macedonia or emigrating to Australia and other countries in the early 1950s (Danforth 1995, 2003).

The U.S. military and economic assistance to the Greek government from 1947 to 1949 was the first fruit of the Truman Doctrine of U.S. commitment to back governments struggling with Communist insurgencies. Even after the defeat of the Greek Communists, collective memory of the critical position of Macedonia in the Civil War combined with the continuing dynamic of the Cold War to create a popular ideology, particularly powerful on the political right, in which leftist politics (whether truly Communist or not) was labeled as "Slavic" and its proponents as "Slavs" or "Bulgarians." This ethnicization of political ideology fits into a pattern of Greek nationalist thought that long predates the Civil War (Herzfeld 1982, 55-60). Classical and, by extension, modern Greek culture are associated with individualism, whereas the Slavs are associated with conformism and collectivism. Harking back to the challenge to Hellenism from the "execrable" Jakob Fallmerayer, the Austrian writer who in the 1840s had denied modern Greeks any racial affinity with the ancient ones and thus viewed them as definitely not European but as a mix of Slavs and Albanians (Herzfeld 1982, 75–81), the recycling of this opposition serves to rescue the Greeks from such a fate. In 1950, it not only made leftist politics un-Greek, it effectively situated Greece in the modern First or "free" World of the United States and Western Europe in counterpoint to the Communist or "captive" Second World of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Makronisos prison camp established to detain and reeducate leftist guerrillas, for example, required inmates to build replicas of ancient Greek monuments to show "not only the inmates but to all dissidents in Greece that the ancient Greek 'spirit,' which had survived to the present, was incompatible with modern radical ideologies. Communists and other left-wing citizens were associated with the national 'other,' which in the context of the Civil War and Cold War was 'Slavo-Communism'" (Hamilakis 2002, 318; also see Van Steen 2005). The Modern Greek historical experience in Macedonia, therefore, continued to have a negatively charged valence in postwar Greece, even as the symbolism of ancient Macedonia as integral to Greece retained its hold on Greek nationalism. If anything, this latter acquired ever greater importance because of continuing difficulty on other irredentist fronts, particularly in bringing Cyprus into the national fold and because of the disaster of 1955 when a pogrom in Istanbul was directed largely against that city's Greek minority, most of whom were forced to flee the city (Kuyucu 2005; Vryonis 2005).

In Cyprus and Istanbul it was Turks, not Slavs, who were the barrier to Greek destiny. Turkish irredentism, however, was seen as a threat elsewhere too, including in Macedonia. Indeed, the existence of Muslim irredentist populations in Greek Thrace, Bulgaria, and Albania was taken as prima facie evidence for a potential encirclement of Greece by the descendants and affiliates of its historic (Ottoman) rulers. Macedonia again figured as the prime zone of contestation in which Greece itself was defined. This contest involved three factors during the years of the Cold War: (1) the subordination of local difference to presumed national homogeneity such that any evidence for distinctive cultural identities in Greek Macedonia was officially denied; (2) the confusion of religious and ethnic modes of identity, particularly with respect to the label "Turks" which could be applied to people of various linguistic and ethnic affinities but that thereby produced a fusion between any kind of ethnic difference and geopolitical threat from a historic enemy; and (3) the belief, encouraged by Greek national governments but with self-evident empirical plausibility, that Greece was vulnerable to attack both from an allegedly expansionist Turkey to the east and an expansionist Communist empire to the north (Kofos 1999; Herzfeld 2003).

Increasingly, however, two conflicting images of Greek culture threatened to divide Greek nationalism: the "Hellenic" as directly derivative of the ancient Greeks from whom "modern" Greeks descended and the "Romeic" in which Greeks were more immediately the inheritors of Byzantine and Turkish influences (Herzfeld 2001, 17). The succession of post–Second World War military governments and, in particular, the Colonels dictatorship of 1967–1974 attempted to resolve these contradictions finally. The dictator George Papadopoulos aggressively pursued what he called a "Greece of the Hellenic Christians," managing in one slogan to bring together both strands of the origins of national culture yet also to draw attention to their mutual exclusivity as pagan and Christian. Herzfeld (2001, 18) notes how much these official efforts related to the Greeks’ often tense engagements with their country’s immediate neighbors. The denial of the existence of a Macedonian [Slav] minority, for example, is commonly assumed to be a reflection of fears about Turkish manipu-
ulation of Macedonian sentiment, and this is certainly an important part of the picture. But it is equally significant that Greek politicians have long felt the need to claim Macedonia as an integral part of what one might call the “prehistory” of the Greek state. It is important to keep these details in mind when contemplating present day struggles over the definition of the past in Greece.

The very discursive lability or unredeemed nature of the border supports the absolutizing of the differences between us and them upon which claims to a distinctive national past rest.

This absolutization of differences became crystal clear at the end of the Cold War. Rather than the euphoria that greeted the collapse of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence in the United States and Western Europe, in Greece there was a sense of foreboding. The worry was that as its northern neighbors lost their geopolitical anchorage Greece would become drawn into the ensuing instability (Kofos 1999, 228–29). Above all, the 1980s had seen the emergence in Yugoslav Macedonia and in the Macedonian diaspora (particularly in Australia and Canada) of a “Macedonism” or Macedonian nationalism that drew exactly opposite conclusions about the “ethnicity” of ancient Macedonia and Alexander the Great than did Greek nationalism (Danforth 1995, 2000; Brunnbauer 2005). The Greek diaspora around the world as well as Greeks at home felt compelled to respond both in public and in their newspapers (Danforth 1995, 2000). This controversy would not have achieved much of a critical juncture but for the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991–1992. The declaration of an independent “Republic of Macedonia,” replete with symbols redolent of ancient Macedonia—such as the “Vergina Sun” and the head of Alexander the Great in profile—was widely seen in Greece as a provocation and threat to the established geopolitical order as well as to Greek nationalist aspirations.

The following four years saw a rising tide of rhetoric on both sides of the border (Brown 2000, 2003; Roudometof 2002; Skoulariki 2003). The slogan “I Macedonia einai elliniki” (Macedonia is Greek) was adopted by many Greeks. Its ambiguity, given that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) had freely used the word “Macedonia” and that Greek Macedonia did not seem to face any sort of immediate military threat, points more to the degree to which Greek nationalism was at best ambiguous about the border rather than to the malign foreign interpretations of Greek motives (e.g., Kofos 1999, 235). Be this as it may, what became clear is that to the majority of Greek public opinion, and across the political spectrum, “no other people, apart from the Greeks, were entitled to use the Macedonian name either as a cultural-ethnic or a geographic-regional appellation” (Kofos 1999, 235). Many Greek intellectuals were particularly active in providing archeological, textual, and historical arguments for why this should be the case (Karakasidou 1993, 1994; Kofos 1999). Of course, the violent path taken elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia as the country unraveled in the 1990s understandably suggested that naming practices could become more than just that. Controlling place names has long had material consequences when, as in the Balkans, those doing the naming have mutually incompatible nationalist goals (e.g., Garde 2004).

Though the Macedonian naming and symbol dispute has now been “resolved” diplomatically, largely under external pressure and because of the dilemmas of Macedonian Slav identity in relation to the sizeable Albanian minority inside the FYROM, the Macedonian Question has long remained alive in Greece. The Macedonian naming controversy has had a continuing resonance in Greece well away from the border concerned. Naming is a powerful social practice in Greek society, indicative of heritage and familial continuity. Thus, given (Christian) names are never chosen casually or on a whim. Using grandparents’ names is particularly widespread. In this way, “parents were carrying out the sacred duty of anástasi, or bringing the ancestors back to life” (Vernier 1984, 40). According to research by Sutton (1997), on the island of Kalymnos (in the Dodecanese Islands that passed to Greek from Italian sovereignty only in 1947 and which is just three miles from the Turkish coast) local ideas about naming children and the inheritance of property, major facets of kinship, were explicitly related to the Macedonian naming dispute. But this was not simply that “naming is about owning” but that, as one respondent put it: “it’s not the name, it’s the falsification of history that I object to” (Sutton 1997, 421). The reasoning here goes to the heart of the matter, reaching back to the raison d’être for Greek nationalism from its beginnings: “the restoration of the glories of the Classical Greek past” (Sutton 1997, 427). The seemingly ever-challenged Macedonian border is thus a critical link in the chain that connects local social practice throughout Greece to the everyday nationalism that has defined what it is to be “Greek.”

“Europe” and Border Making in Macedonia

Nationalism allows [people] to forget contingency.
—Gregory Jusdanis, Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture, 1991
Greece is undoubtedly unique in having to combine the contrasting “roles of Ūr-Europa and humiliated oriental vassal at one and the same time. These two roles might seem mutually incompatible, were it not for the fact that both imply inferiority to the ‘true’ Europeans of today” (Herzfeld 1987, 19–20). This implied inferiority obviously sets the country apart from other cases, except perhaps Italy, where only the first role ever comes into play. But in its very exceptionalism, Greece does bring into clearer focus the importance of the European model of statehood exported from Northern Europe as the ideal type around which border making in Macedonia, as well as border making in the world of neostates well beyond European shores, has revolved. As one of the putative seats of European civilization in the distant past it is to Greece that Europeans have looked for historical legitimation as to their political lineage. Yet, tainted in the European geopolitical imagination by centuries of Ottoman rule, Greece has had to follow the lead of the northerners in recapturing the world they had lost during Byzantine and Ottoman times. To a considerable extent, therefore, the nature and meaning of the Greek past as well as the model for its political future were imported from Northern Europe. If the present focus is mainly on the latter, in practice they cannot be readily disentangled from one another. In this section I offer an analytic breakdown of the main practical and discursive components of the argument implicit in the narrative provided previously.

On the southern edge of modern Europe, Greece was the first place where the model of the European territorial nation-state was made from scratch with the full-scale importation of spatial-political imaginary, liberators, political leadership, and bureaucratic personnel from elsewhere. Greece achieved formal political independence (1832) at a relatively early date before the other Balkan countries and also before Italy (1861), Germany (1871), and Norway (1905). It also was the first modern state to acquire independence from an empire. Of course, this prototype has been followed since then to one degree or another all over the world. If the Ottomans were forced to give ground, Greek nationalists, like nationalists since the world over, still relied heavily on foreign sponsors to both inform their national project and to protect its achievements. Indeed, for the Greeks the reliance on and domination by foreigners has never really ended. Its national sovereignty has always remained pro forma (Faubion 1993, 124; Gourgouris 1996). From the outset and down to the present, Greek governments have depended heavily on imitating dominant foreigners in order to realize their limited effective sovereignty within the national territory. The founding Greek nationalists of the 1820s received their education in the romance of the nation from French and German experience with a later generation more affected by British ideas of both Greekness and the nature of their state-making. This imitation followed from the fact that the Greek War of Independence was supported materially by the Great Powers such as Russia, France, and Britain, and the nationalist claim to nationhood relied on either the French idea of “civilization” or the German rhetoric of “race” in the face of Ottoman imperial rule. In using such language, “The Greek revolutionaries . . . did not expect to persuade the Ottomans of their righteousness. But they did expect to persuade the Europeans, from whom, after all, they had imported the spirit, if not the letter, of their verbiage. They met with some success: recall the hordes of philhellenes who came to their defense” (Faubion 1993, 123).

In the eighteenth century in Northern Europe as sovereignty shifted from dynasties to peoples, a parallel search was under way both to define European uniqueness and to vest it in the character of the particular nation. If until this time European intellectuals and political leaders had understood their history as Roman and Christian in origin, during the eighteenth century the emphasis shifted to distinguishing Europe totally from elsewhere (what is often termed “Orientalism”) and to grounding modern Europe in an idealized Hellenic Greece (Morris 1994; Settis 2006). Initially continentalist rather than nationalist in geographical orientation, by the time of the American and French Revolutions, many of whose proponents proclaimed ancient Athenian ideals, Hellenism “created an idealized ancient Greece as the birthplace of European spirit and western civilization. It constituted a powerful ideology that had as its ultimate objective the legitimation of Eurocentric beliefs” (Athanassopoulou 2002, 280). All over Europe attempts at creating the “new Athens” were proclaimed as the northerners—from Edinburgh to Munich and many points in between—claimed the historic mantle of the ancient Greeks (Reszler 2004). Because Greece had fallen from its historic grace, however, any restoration had to reflect the fact that its best values had been revived by European nations other than the Greeks who now needed their help in removing the Ottoman yoke. Most famously, the “sunset melancholy” of the English poet Lord Byron’s philhellenic poetry conjures up both the “plundered ruins of the Parthenon [in Athens]” and “a Hellenic glory now noticeably absent” (Leask 2004, 99–100). Byron, of course, at least committed himself physically as well as emotionally to the cause of Greek independence and died during its course.
Arguably, it is Byronic imagery more than ancient Greece tout court that subsequently became the over-riding inspiration for foreign, particularly Anglo-American, concern for Greece and what separated it from its neighbors. When they thought of ancient Greece, northerners held on to an image of the Parthenon, and “when they thought of modern Greece, they recalled [Byron’s] Childe Harold and ‘The Isles of Greece.’ When they thought of Bulgaria, they might well remember that, according to Shaw, Bulgarians did not wash their hands” (Roessel 2002, 148). In this construction, the “resurrection” of Greece was more than just releasing a people to build a nation-state; it was about the positive effect this would have on returning the whole of Europe to an idealized ancient Greece of heroic individuals and purposes. Only with the self-destructive immolation of the First World War and the Greek Catastrophe in Asia Minor in 1922 did the romantic image of Greece begin to lessen. Even then, the value of the Hellenic past as an ideological currency remained clear to all, including those who might try to argue for the counterclaims, in Macedonia or elsewhere, of Turks, Bulgarians, and Serbs.

The “idea” of Greece, however, always threatened to escape out of the hands of the northerners and into the hands of the local Greeks, including those directing the Greek state. The Greek “neohellenes” were faced from the outset with a border that left most of those whom they defined as ethnically Greek outside the confines of the state. The “artificial” borders of the Hellenic state were increasingly contrasted to the “natural” boundaries of the Hellenic nation, with the former seen as a creation of European diplomats. To some, above all a writer-activist like Dragoumis, this took the form of “communitarian nationalism” in which the topos or land of Hellas was wherever Greeks lived according to Greek norms (Leontis 1995, 81–83). Of course, this standard ran up against the singular “territorial ethos” of statehood. In this construction, the borders of Hellas needed to include the “unredeemed” Greeks within a single state territory. It was the state that ultimately had the fate of the nation and its civilization in its hands. This fed into the Great Idea (megálí ideá) of expanding the state throughout a space well beyond that of the Greek Kingdom as it then was. At the same time, an aesthetic nationalism more in tune with northern proclivities identified the topos of Hellenism not with the unredeemed nation but with the landscape of the Greek peninsula. From this viewpoint, one that became more powerful after the failure of Greek irredentism in 1922, the pull of Hellenism is centripetal, toward the natural features and folk traditions (necessarily not immediately Hellenic) of the Attic coast and the adjacent Aegean, and away from external expansion (Leontis 1995, 84).

Greek territorial aspirations were subject to powerful external questioning. Successive British governments, in particular, at the height of British global geopolitical influence in the late nineteenth century, regarded the Great Idea with considerable disdain. Though sympathetic to expansion in Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, they consistently frowned on the larger ambitions of Greek nationalism. The Ottoman Empire was seen increasingly as a bulwark, if a dangerously crumbling one, against Russian and German ambitions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. As Tzanelli (2004) has shown at some length, the rhetorical strategy of British ministers and journalists was to dismiss Greek territorial ambitions as too bold for a country that was now simply a protégé of Britain. Using a language of “family” and “protection,” Greece was portrayed as a wayward “child” to Britain’s stern (and masculine) parent. Yet, concurrently, given the degree to which both sides shared a Hellenic ideal, “the Greeks tried to present Modern Greece as the resurrected progenitor/parent of British culture, who had to be helped to be a great nation. By invoking the ghostly Hellenic past that haunted the British present, the Greeks hoped to apply to Britain the same disciplinary attitudes that British commentators had ‘tried on them’” (Tzanelli 2004, 117).

The idea of Greeks as childlike people experimenting with statehood, however, has not been easily erased from the collective attitudes of Northern Europeans. Greece has long remained not fully European even in the declarations of many long-term foreign residents, whose images of a timeless place beyond modernity recall Montesquieu’s image of a fallen Southern Europe (e.g., Wills 2005). In the face of such recalcitrant imagery, Greek nationalists have veered between retreating into a past of “eternal verities” (Herzfeld 1987) to justify themselves or adjusting pragmatically to demands made on them from outsiders (Faubion 1993, xvii–xx).

Ultimately, demarcating a definitive Greece relied more on establishing historic landscape traces than on redeeming Greeks abroad. Not surprisingly, given the importance of the ancient ruins in the philhellenic imagination, a Greece “purified” of its post-Hellenic accretions was an important part of both the Byronic legacy and post-independence Greek attempts at monumentalizing the heroic Hellenic past in the contemporary landscape. Concern with identifying, dating, and saving “ruins” and antique objects long predates Greek independence. But, as illustrated by the notorious removal of the Parthenon marbles by agents of the British Lord Elgin, there had been little commitment to keeping
objects in situ or preserving major monuments in something approaching what might have been their original splendor. Remains such as these served to help vindicate English (and other) affinities, both racial and cultural, with ancient Greece but at the expense of the locals (Leoussi 2001). During the 1820s, however, the idea of “purifying” ancient monuments, preventing the export of antiquities, and establishing the archeological record connecting past to present became firmly established in Greece. It was as if the antiquities formed a sort of “symbolic capital” that could be used to establish political legitimacy in the eyes of significant foreigners: “On that symbolic and authoritative resource, rights to political self-determination for the Greek population as a whole could be built” (Hamilakis and Yalouri 1999). The archeological “record” has subsequently become one of the main bases upon which Greek claims to territory and the resurrection of the Greek nation to statehood have come to rest. By isolating individual monuments and sacralizing the landscapes in which they are embedded, most importantly in the case of the Parthenon on the Athenian Acropolis, “the palimpsest was rearranged to reflect the fundamental role of the classical past to the national cause” (Athanassopoulou 2002, 299).

If Athens was the undoubted center for this activity, the provinces necessarily provided the settings where archeology could reveal, alongside folklore, the buried landscape of the ancient nation undergoing revival. Finding artifacts and discovering hidden linguistic usages would expose the true spatial writ of the nation-state (Hertzfeld 1982; Peckham 2001, 115–22). “Mining the landscape” thus became a major enterprise particularly at times when regions such as Macedonia were subject to active contestation or when domestic politics led to competitive nationalism between political groups. Thus, for example, in 1896 when the Macedonian struggle was heating up, the philologist and geographer Dimitras published a detailed study, *Macedonia in Speaking Stones and Surviving Monuments*, that was “The product of years of laborious library field work from one end of Macedonia to the other, this book stimulated among Greeks interest and pride in their national roots, as well as a sense of legal ownership of the land with the hidden testimonies of its Greekness” (Kofos 1990, 107). This approach combined both the vertical appropriation of the material remains of the past with the horizontal claim to lands beyond present borders (Peckham 2001, 120–21).

Today little explicitly remains of this strategy. The roadside maps of classical archeological sites scattered throughout Greek Macedonia today, while emphasizing through their use of routes the connectivities within the territory, also boldly demarcate the present border.
without explicit claims as to what may lie beyond (Figure 2). The excavations at Vergina associated with Alexander the Great, fortunately within the confines of Greek Macedonia, obviously can inspire a vision of a Greater Macedonia with very much a Greek patina. Simultaneously, ethnological and general local museums in northern Greece reinforce the image of Greek ethnic homogeneity in the region, for example, by highlighting as “pure Greek” the Sarakatsani nomads who once grazed their flocks across Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace and beyond (as in the Sarakatsani Folklore Museum in Serres). This is to nationalize a group whose wanderings actually would defy the territorial limits today associated with being of Greece and to neglect the intimate association such groups often had with non-Greeks and cultural hybrids of one sort or another (such as Greek-speaking Vlachs). The very mountain ranges that once provided summer pastures for the pastoralists became borders between new states, in the process destroying the way of life now celebrated by the colorful costumes and household relics displayed in the museums as symbols of an essential Greekness (Wardle 2003).

The Hellenic elements in (or, more usually, under) the visible landscape obviously offered the most direct evidence of prior occupation of Macedonia by Greeks and thus validated the claim of “historical right” to the region. Elements from Byzantine and Ottoman periods, however, obviously offered the greater difficulty in incorporating the region into a coherent national genealogy (Mazower 2004, 429–40). Though the Sarakatsani and others might be territorialized in museum representations, physical remnants of previous eras have proved more difficult. Old Byzantine Orthodox churches, for example, signify a Christianity long shared across ethnic lines rather than neatly Greek in progeny. Mosques and other buildings from the Ottoman centuries have been converted to other uses (as in the conversion of the house of one of Salonica’s leading Jewish families into the Folklore and Ethnological Museum of Macedonia and Thrace), demolished, or left in place either because of bureaucratic inertia or deliberate purpose to remind locals and visitors of liberation from Ottoman rule (e.g., Figure 3).

Of course, efforts at idealized homogenizing of the actually heterogeneous and transversal are not peculiar to Greece. They have been absolutely central to the entire project of nation-state building as begun in Northern Europe. For example, when “minority” groups are identified they are presumed to be wholly identifiable in terms of state-based nationalities rather than unique cultural compositions with sets of distinctive traits. Thus, European human rights discourse when applied to Greek Macedonia is all about “Greeks” and “Macedonian Slavs” and rarely if ever about the mixed and hybridized identities of many localized households and groups. This discourse reflects all too well the experience of Northern Europeans in territorializing ethnic difference or expunging it from their territorialized maps. Yet, the very identification of distinctive identities across the border raises the specter of an uncertain parallelism between ethnic boundaries and national borders that Greek everyday nationalism both vehemently denies explicitly yet implicitly relies on to succor the image of a nation-state ever under siege. The 1994 report of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch on Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece, for example, played right into this uncertain parallelism by asserting a blanket distinction between Greeks, on the one hand, and Macedonians, presumably entirely Slavic in language and identity, on the other, as the only two ethnic categories at work in the region. Not surprisingly there was a blistering response from the Greek side pointing out both the “uses” to which the report could be put by the FYROM side in the ongoing dispute over the naming of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the real
ambiguities surrounding the use of the term “Macedonian” as employed in Greek Macedonia (Vlasidis and Karakostanoglou 1995).

In a similar vein, the much more carefully calibrated research of the Greek-American anthropologist Anastasia Karakasidou (1993, 1997) set off a firestorm of criticism in Greece for its portrayal of coercive measures practiced by the Greek state down the years to limit any expression of a Macedonian Slav or Slavo-Macedonian cultural idiom in Greek Macedonia (see, e.g., Gounaris 1993; Hatzidimitriou 1993; Zahariadis 1993; Karakasidou 1995; Roudometof 1996). As Karakasidou (1995, 113) noted: “what could have been regarded as a latently benign sense of ethnic identity among . . . Slavic-speakers [has been redefined] as a potentially hostile national identity.” What she failed to consider was that this is precisely how national identities use historically fuzzy borderlands to enforce the perception of national borders under threat.19 Human rights talk about rights for a geographically concentrated foreign minority in a borderland region of great symbolic importance to Greek nationalism, then, provides a simple either/or conception of ethnic identity that encourages exactly what it claims to abhor.20 To Greek nationalists, with their powerful sense of Macedonia as an inherently Greek region, there could be no better way of raising their ire (Figure 4).21

A Balkan Border Facing a Fraying Global Political Logic?

There are no longer any barbarians.
And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?
Those people were a kind of solution.
—(Constantine P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians,” 1904)

Though hardly yet passing into history, the Macedonian border of Greece is one of many whose cultural logic of exclusion may seem less obvious today than at any time since the eighteenth century. If at one time, as the British “expert” on borders Lord Curzon (1908, 7) said: “Just as the protection of the home is the most vital care of the private citizen, so the integrity of her borders is the condition of existence of the State,” today this singular exclusionary logic shows signs of fraying in the face of challenges to the legal, economic, geopolitical, and military functions of borders (Du¨rrschmidt 2006). For one thing, Greece is now part of the supranational European Union which increasingly has come to superintend many of the regulatory activities once monopolized by the government in Athens. For another, the Greek economy is ever more tied into the global economy through its reliance on tourism, shipping, and financial services. These are undoubtedly powerful

Figure 4. “Macedonia is Greek”: A residual graffito from the early 1990s in Salonica. (Source: Author, May 2004.)
trends that portend diminished material pressures for the imposition of rigid national borders. In particular, with globalization the scope for the flowering of local complex identities has expanded considerably (Agnew 2003).

At the same time, however, even if only temporarily, the Macedonian border has become an external border to the European Union as whole and, because of Greece’s location between the Middle East and Europe, an important setting for the biopolitical policing of Europe to prevent or regulate the influx of groups of one sort or another. The rise of an “integral” Europe, concerned about declining internal cultural homogeneity, has not surprisingly coincided with the immigration of “unmeltable ethnics” overwhelmingly from the Balkan states to the north of Greece, the Middle East, and North Africa (Holmes 2000). This has led to greater efforts at preventing or limiting immigration in the first place. From this perspective, the border of Greece in Macedonia remains very much in play.

National identities are never given; they are produced historically under particular geographical conditions (Balibar 2002). As those conditions change, so, even after some lag, should the continuing pressures towards reproducing national identities at borders. In Europe it has become common to ask if the nation-state is not facing a political crisis with the end of the Cold War, economic globalization, and the increased ambiguity of political identities, defined across geographical scales (European, national, local, etc.) and social groups (class, religious, ethnic, etc.). This crisis seems particularly acute in the periphery of Europe, not least because it is here that the state has been most hollowed out by globalization since states such as Greece never did have much of the welfare orientation found to the north. In other words, there has been less to hollow out. With the end of the Cold War, states such as Greece have also lost the political leverage they once had over their geopolitical sponsors such as Britain and the United States. Yet the European Union does not seem to have provided even the beginning of much of an alternative to the nation-state in the construction of a Europe-wide “nationalism.”

It seems irrefutable, however, that people in Greek Macedonia (and more broadly across Greece) have begun to think politically well beyond the confines of the Greek state. Some of this thinking is a direct result of the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s that have spilled over into Greece, including significant streams of refugees from Albania and elsewhere as the states there imploded (e.g., Serematakis 1996; Hart 1999; Green 2003). Many Greeks have begun to see themselves as both European and Balkan (Calotychos 2003, 289; Far-inou-Malamatari 2003). The meaning of “European” has also begun to change, as hitherto excluded groups (such as the Slavs and Albanians) are drawn into the project of European unification. Even more important, the possible accession of Turkey to the European Union undermines the way in which the drawing of firm cultural and geographical boundaries between Europe and Asia has underpinned Greek nationalism’s Europeanist conception of Hellenism. Much of this was heralded and validated by the reaction of Northern Europeans to the dispute over the FYROM naming controversy in the 1990s. In particular, the European press did not react to the dispute in terms of the exotic romanticism kindled by Byron but with sympathy for a land-locked statelet faced with intransigent Greeks using arguments about their ancient occupation of Macedonia to officially justify their intransigence (see, e.g., on the German press, Kentrotis 1995). A “new” multicultural Europe had no time for an old-style border controversy that was widely (if incorrectly) blamed entirely on Greek nationalism.

Perhaps even more apparent than the widening of the geographical frame of reference for political identities has been its simultaneous narrowing for many people (Leontidou, Donnan, and Afouxenidis 2005). The mania for fifth columns and enemies within has undoubtedly eased in official Greece. This has meant that a variety of local-ethnic identities have appeared from hiding, so to speak, such as those Vereni (2000, 47–67) reports from western Greek Macedonia: “simply Greek,” “Macedonian-Greek,” “Slav,” and “Bulgarian.” But this is not simply the reemergence of “ancient, suppressed” identities, rooted in the Macedonian soil. Rather, such politics need to be understood as a site where a transnational array of actors are renegotiating identities and making claims within a reconfigured global political context” (Cowan and Brown 2000, 14). Key have been such factors as the political activism of Diaspora ethnic nationalists (Schwartz 1997), the cultural or segmented division of labor in many villages with Turkish refugee offspring relatively overrepresented in state jobs and with land ownership as a continuing source of political dispute and ethnicization (van Boeschoten 2000), distinctions between Turkophone and Greek-speaking Orthodox refugees over land, jobs, and the need to prove “Greekness” (e.g., Koliopoulos 1994; Voutira 1997), and increased intermarriage between Dopii (Patriarchist “Bulgarians”), various Greek refugee groups, and Sarakatsani, producing less exclusive identities in terms of local rates (population categories; Agelopoulos 1997).

Yet it would be a mistake to see this apparent pluralism as a sign of widespread acceptance of an
ideological multiculturalism in relation to the established menu of political identities. This localized phenomenon in areas largely of declining population has been eclipsed in official priorities by the rise of relatively large immigrant populations (of Albanians, Bosnians, Bulgarians, ethnic-Greek immigrants from Bulgaria, and others) particularly in and around Salonica (Agelopoulos 2000; Hatziprokopiou 2004; Mazower 2004, 432–40). If non-Greek indigenous “others” still seem in the past and not in the present, it is the recent immigrants who are more likely to pose the much greater challenge to the future of a culturally homogenized Greek national territory.23 Indeed, as Salonica is reestablished as a metropolis for the whole of Southeastern Europe, as it was during the late Ottoman period, and ceases to be overwhelmingly ethnically Greek in population, political tensions within Greek nationalism are likely to shift away from Macedonia at large and to that city in particular.

Meanwhile, European integration has hardly deprived EU member states of their sovereignty, as a fashionable argument would have it (e.g., Wallace 1999). Rather, the member states still “successfully claim a sovereign status vis-à-vis other states and international organizations and still enjoy the rights and powers related to that status” (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 304). The sovereignty debate has shifted, however, in two respects: to the issue of the borders of the EU and thus away from the continuing importance of national borders in themselves and to the position of the respective states within the institutional apparatus of the EU and other international organizations. It is the former that concerns us here. As the liberalization of trade and finance has made borders more permeable, anxieties about crime, terrorism, illegal immigration, and trafficking in women and children have increased commensurately. These concerns have taken a new shape in Europe because since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) movement of people within most of the EU has been freed by transferring checking to the external border. Greece’s Macedonian border is one of these. Even with Bulgaria’s accession to the EU this will remain so for many years because Bulgarians will not have free access to residence elsewhere in the EU.

The so-called Schengen zone (named after the town where the original decision was made in 1985 to abolish barriers to movement within the EU) has revalued the external border as defining a “security field” to keep out those foreign undesirables associated with the various anxieties that globalization has engendered (Walters 2002). In this way the external border of the EU substitutes a new alien threat for the old (ethnic-national) one of Greece’s national border. This substitution is primarily biopolitical in the sense of being about regulating populations through the “filter function of border controls” (den Boer 1995, 92). Of course, borders have carried out such functions for some time, particularly since the early twentieth century. What is new is the extent to which border controls now extend throughout the national territories of the EU (enforced by national police forces) rather than just at the external land borders and the classification of “types” of populations who can pass through easily and others who cannot (ethnic profiling). Traveling by train in Macedonia near the border with FYROM when Romani are picked out by the Greek border police through obvious ethnic profiling for special scrutiny of their passports and visas is a reminder of how much the border still matters not just in policing distant others who might want to cross but those who have long lived their lives across this particular border. If the Greek borderland in Greek Macedonia is today less threatening because its population has become largely

Figure 5. “No Border, No Nation”: One of several graffiti on a storefront shutter in Salonica. The use of English suggests that the sentiment is directed beyond a Greek audience. (Source: Author, May 2004.)
Greek (of one sort or another), the border still matters but now because of new external threats that can come across it. That these are threats to “Europe” rather than just to Greece would make generations of Greek nationalists smile with a certain self-satisfaction (Figure 5).

Conclusion

The nation-state everywhere as we know it today is the product of the European model that emerged in the seventeenth century and was then progressively imposed/exported elsewhere. In this historical-geographical context, the case of Greece provides some illuminating points for understanding the course of nation-statehood everywhere else. It was one of the first places where a new nation-state was made from part of an old but non-European (in progeny) empire. Perhaps because Greece has been seen by Europeans as one of the sources of their own civilization, Greek nationalists seem also to have adopted to an extreme degree the binary view of world space-time (modern/traditional) that came along with the nation-state. Yet, Greece shows that a dual sense of identity, in this case an externally-oriented Hellenic face and an internally-oriented demotic one, can coexist and provide a practical potential opening of Greek territory to the development of complex local identities. The dynamics of the Macedonian Question reveal—and this is supposedly one of the best examples of ancient hatreds to be found anywhere—that there is nothing natural (or ancient), pace the cross-pressure perspective, about the collective enmities to which hard borders are supposedly the best solution. Rather than emerging in response to absolute antagonism between primordial or essentialized groups, antagonism, like the groups to which it refers, has to be made.

This is where borders come in. The original European model was a direct response to the religious bloodletting of the early seventeenth century. Its projection into the margins of Europe and beyond was marketed as a solution to the problem of providing a cultural justification for statehood: the nation. Making the nation requires reaching deep into the past to provide a genealogy with specific sites, and using evidence from archeological and historical studies to justify current or expansive borders, create a capital city, and sanctify national monuments. Territory, and the borders that define it, thus gives material shape to the national “dream of emancipation” (Leontis 1995, 35). In Greece, the Western tradition of a classical Hellenic past proved especially compelling in providing the national genealogy, but this offered no ready solution to where to place the borders of the modern nation-state. This is where Macedonia came in. It provided the critical regional confluence between the national memory of a heroic Hellenic past and the existence of an uncertain present focused on the border in question. In this construction, it is borders and the threats to them from beyond (and before) which they conjure up that makes the nations and not vice versa. Once the borders are oh so tentatively in position and not before, the nation-state in its turn begins to make its place.

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Notes

1. The recurrent crisis in the United States over the “broken border” with Mexico is a case in point. Rarely if ever is the U.S.-Mexico border “issue” placed in a wider geographical field of reference (such as the fact that both the United States and Mexico belong to NAFTA) or related to the question of borders in general (e.g., that U.S. borders no longer really define the U.S. polity given the national government’s increasing penchant for unilateral military interventions and extraterritorial definition of judicial authority).

2. Unfortunately, most current discussion of alternative spatialities in geography and other fields is usually expressed in either/or rather than more nuanced overlapping/shift ing incidence terms (see, e.g., Marston et al. 2005 versus Brenner 2005). For a theoretical perspective drawing on the writings of Michel Foucault and others that tries to do so, see, for example, Agnew (2005, chap. 3) and Coleman and Agnew (2007).

3. Another way of putting this would be to say that bona fide boundaries (such as coastlines, rivers, etc.) are frequently confused with fiat boundaries involving human demarcation such that the latter are seen as at least akin to natural occurrences that deserve no further explanation (on the two types of boundaries, see Smith and Varzi 2000).

4. In the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 Schmitt’s emphasis on the ontology of friends and enemies would seem to have undergone a significant revival, particularly in the declarations of the G. W. Bush administration in the United States and its radical adversaries in the Muslim world (Norris 2005). Whether this necessitates a revival of thinking in terms of friends and enemies à la Schmitt, however, is another thing entirely. Why should Schmitt’s contempt for others be turned into a
universalistic self-fulfilling prophecy? This is not to say that there may not be aspects of Schmitt's thinking that are worth investigating for their analytic usefulness. It is a particular aspect of Schmitt's thought that I am concerned with here, not with his writing tout court.

5. In this construction, it is often concrete kinship and place connections more than an abstract ethnicity that are key in constituting the social worlds from which border claims emanate and in which national identities are negotiated (Eriksen 2004).

6. Most theories of the state in geography are crudely materialist and functionalist in character, reflecting their origins in either rational choice theory or versions of Marxism of an economic base–political superstructure variety. They have no place for the cultural logic of nation-statehood.

7. Etienne Balibar (2002) argues that just as the "national-form" is intimately related to the "production of individuality" (p. 66), so all nationalisms "stand in a relation to the nation-state" (p. 64) even if not all nationalisms at any one time are necessarily statist. All nationalisms, by definition, aspire to nation-statehood.

8. Disemia, or cultural intimacy, as Michael Herzfeld (2005, 14) has termed it elsewhere, refers to the "tension between official self-presentation and what goes on in the privacy of collective introspection" or the opposition between official and vernacular cultural forms. Sarah Green (2005, 125) points out that the possibilities of agency in regard to the vernacular are often limited "particularly in relation to the state, where 'definitional' and 'legalistic' ideologies tend to be given political, bureaucratic, and economic 'teeth.'" The ethnographic research of Karakasidou (1997, 2002) provides ample evidence of the subsequent "bite" in Greek Macedonia.

9. The use of the qualifier "modern" in front of Greece presumes, of course, that otherwise all Greeks and Greece are considered "ancient." This is precisely what the philhellenes had on their minds.

10. By "territorial hysteria" I mean a popular fear and panic about losing or missing out in the ongoing partition, not the medical or psychoanalytic meaning of the word as a neurrotic disorder associated with dysfunction or dissatisfaction either in general or as unique to the "Balkans." Although, as Slavoj Žižek (2005, 116) notes, citing Mladen Dolar's reading of Freud's references to the region: "that the European unconscious is structured like the Balkans, is thus literally true: in the guise of the Otherness of 'Balkan', Europe takes cognizance of the 'stranger in itself,' of its own repressed." The danger here is of a reversed reification in which "Europe" is swapped for the Balkans as the hysterical in question!

11. A competitive ethnic cartography during this time period tried to establish definitive Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, and other claims to Macedonia on the basis of maps of ethnic affiliations (see Wilkinson 1951; Peckham 2001, 137–45). By the time of the First Balkan War important reforming groups among the Turks (particularly the famous "Young Turks") had also begun to think in nationalist/ethnic/religious terms but without the possibility of finding much scope for this enterprise in the Balkans (Ülker 2005).

12. Anastasia Karakasidou (1997, 141) alleges that Macedonia was not a "priority" for Greek leaders in 1915 when she states that they were willing to bargain at least part of it away to Bulgaria. Apart from possible inaccuracy in how she recounts the story (Carabott 1999), on her reading this is plausible because the leaders of the time did not think of Macedonia as an integral part of the Greek nation-state. Of course, this could have also been a temporary ploy on their part and it contradicts considerable evidence that since the late nineteenth century and, certainly since the 1920s, Macedonia has indeed been of continuing central significance to the Greek nationalist political imagination.

13. The Greek novelist Andreas Nenedakis (Herzfeld 1997, 96) notes how the term "Slavic" was applied as a synonym for left-wingers/Communists by Greek Royalist army officers to some of their compatriots fighting with the Allies in North Africa during the Second World War. The irony in this, as noted by Herzfeld, is in an anecdote from Tsingos (p. 119), a novel by Nenedakis: "A distinguished officer whose name was slavicized . . . was officially called a Bulgarian on the grounds that his ancestors had come from Eastern Thrace (Tsingos, p. 119)—a part of present-day Bulgaria once heavily populated by Greeks and thus one of the territories coveted by Greek irredentists. Such bureaucratic categorization betrays not a hint of its central paradox: that the territory is essentially Greek even though a left-leaning Greek from the area must, for political reasons, be Bulgarian." A Greek-speaking tourist guide in Athens in May 2004 described the Greek Civil War in my presence as an "ethnic conflict," thus situating it in the same discourse as being about ethos or nationality rather than about ideology per se. Once in widespread circulation, such ideas seem to die hard.

14. Diasporic nationalism is often particularly vehement in its attachments to often distant homelands. As Wiebe (2002, 21) points out, "deep attachments to a place do not require living there. Indeed, many migrants first discovered their home by leaving it, by making it something other than the only thing."

15. In Greece, unlike for example Italy, "localism" has fed directly into nationalism rather than competed with it. Herzfeld (2003, 290) traces this to the early post-independence expropriation of local folklore studies by nationalists in which a "precocious unity was predicated on the projection of Athens as the moral, spiritual, and political center back onto an ancient world that certainly would not have been unanimous in according it such primacy." In Italy, Rome has never enjoyed such cultural authority over the country at large. It was and remains sui generis, testimony itself to irreconcilable local differences.

16. Clothing, not the least that of Sarakatsani women, has been particularly important in representing the embodiment of aboriginal Greece. This is what Herzfeld (1987, 95) terms "the clothing of identity."

17. The 1994 exhibition at the Folklore and Ethnological Museum of Macedonia and Thrace (FEMMT) in Salonica on "The Traditional Culture of the Florina Region" (FEMMT 1994, 85) perhaps overstated the free "choice" involved in becoming Greek in and around Florina when the curator wrote, "Ultimately one's nationality was what one wanted it to be." That this would obviously be Greek while the threat to undermine the "choice" would be Slavic is betrayed in the following sentence: "If, for instance, a Slavonic-speaker disregarded the pressures and threats of the komittadis and insisted on regarding himself as Greek,
remaining true to the Orthodox faith, and sending his children to Greek schools, who are we to deny him this right?" At least this exhibition and its Guide admitted to a modicum of the historic complexity of linguistic and ethnic identities in the Florina district.

18. Slavoj Žižek (2005, 116), in referring to how the term “Balkan” has become shorthand in Western Europe and North America for ethnic violence, religious intolerance, and fixation on historical trauma, points out how these were all introduced to the region from the West. He notes, inter alia, in alluding to the former Ottoman masters in much of the Balkans, “Let us not forget that the two great ethnic crimes imputed to the Turks in the 20th century—the Armenian genocide and the persecution of the Kurds—were not committed by traditionalist Muslim political forces, but by the military modernizers who sought to cut Turkey loose from its old-world ballast and turn it into a European nation-state.” For an empirical analysis of Turkish Republican use of racial categories, see, for example, Isyar (2005).

19. This should not be understood as a personal reproach but in terms of falling into a discursive trap. In the 1990s Anastasia Karakasidou displayed considerable personal bravery and intellectual determination and skill in the face of often shrill and violent criticism from Greek nationalist academics and political activists.

20. There is perhaps no better indicator of the syncretic/crossover character of local Macedonian identities than the music and dancing in the region which combine and blend a variety of influences from all over the Balkans, and beyond (see, e.g., Cowan 1990; FEMMT 1994; and Blau et al. 2002).

21. Fear and intolerance are not, therefore, bred by perceived threats to distinctive national identities but by the delusion of “the desire for pure difference” (Orlie 1999, 146). This desire is illustrated by the frequent use in Greek Macedonia of the term “pure Greek,” indicating in its claim to exclusivity in identity some uncertainty about others in the vicinity.

22. Emphasizing that identities are invariably the provisional outcome of processes of identification (as in Balibar 2002 and much contemporary critical theory) understates the degree to which, as Kompridis (2005) argues, an assimilative logic is at work in denying the firmness and exclusivity of many cultural identities.

23. It is worth noting the profound “triumph of the ethnos” in Greece (Just 1989) in that over the course of only a century and a half Greek nationalism created an almost entirely homogeneous Greek society out of a previously complex ethnic/nonethnic mosaic. This may have been something of a self-fulfilling prophecy; in the Greek language ethnos and nation are one and the same thing!

References


